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TRIBUTE

A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR
PENNY WHITE
E. Alan Groves*
In August 2017, Professor Penny White1 stepped
down from her position as faculty advisor to the
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy. On behalf of the
journal’s editors, I write to express our warmest thanks
and deepest appreciation for Professor White’s steadfast
commitment to the journal and its members, both past
and present.
Professor White’s relationship with the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy dates back to the journal’s
founding in 2004 when she agreed to serve as one of the
journal’s original faculty advisors. As a former Tennessee
Supreme Court justice, a successful former litigator, and
an accomplished academic, Professor White brought a
wealth of experience to the journal. She shared this
experience by helping the journal with fundraising,
J.D. Candidate, May 2018, The University of Tennessee
College of Law.
1 Penny White serves The University of Tennessee College of
Law in three different capacities: She is the E.E. Overton
Distinguished Professor of Law, the Director of the Center for
Advocacy and Dispute Resolution, and the Interim Director of
Clinical Programs.
*
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article solicitation, and publishing a written work of her
own.2
Further, Professor White has been instrumental
in allowing the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy to
co-host an annual symposium with the College of Law’s
Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution. Each year,
the journal invites professionals from various academic
disciplines to speak about contemporary issues in law
and public policy. The annual symposium continues to
ignite the imagination of the campus community and
provides journal members with unique opportunities to
interact with policy experts and well-respected members
of the bench and bar. These annual events are made
possible by the vision of Professor White, the
administrative support of her assistant Jenny Lackey,
and the financial support of the Center for Advocacy and
Dispute Resolution.
Finally, Professor White has served as a
remarkable mentor and role model for the student editors
of the journal. Students who have served as Editor in
Chief or Symposium Editor have personally witnessed
the time and energy Professor White has invested in the
journal. These students have also witnessed the grace
and humility with which Professor White conducts her
daily affairs; she does not lord her titles over students or
colleagues, and, no matter how busy she is, Professor
White always makes time to meet with students in her
office. To everyone on campus, Professor White is known
for her strength, her integrity, and (most of all) her love
for people.
Thus, it is with sad hearts that the editors of the
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy bid farewell to our
longtime faculty advisor. Of course, we will no doubt
See generally Penny White, If it Ain’t Broke, Break it—How
the Tennessee General Assembly Dismantled and Destroyed
Tennessee’s Uniquely Excellent Judicial System, 10 TENN. J.L.
& POL’Y 329 (2015).
2
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continue to learn from Professor White in clinics and in
the classroom, and we will forever be touched by the
example of her life and her legacy in the law. Turning the
page, we now look forward to continuing this journal’s
tradition of excellence under the supervision of our
current faculty advisor, Professor Bradley A. Areheart.
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ARTICLE

JUDICIAL HOT POTATO
AN ANALYSIS OF BIFURCATED COURTS OF
LAST RESORT IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA
Brent M. Hanson*
I. History
A. Texas
1. Pre-Civil War
2. Reconstruction
a. Constitution of Texas (1866)

166
166
166
167
168

Brent M. Hanson received his Juris Doctor from the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, magna cum laude. He
also holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from
California State University, Fresno, summa cum laude. He
currently practices commercial and securities litigation in
Houston, Texas as an Associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP. He has graciously accepted a clerkship
with the Honorable Leslie H. Southwick of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2018. He would like to thank
his wife, Kyle Hanson, for all her support; his professors Amy
Wax and Cathy Struve, who provided much needed direction,
criticism, and guidance; and the editors of the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy for their diligent work and helpful
suggestions. The views expressed in this Article are his own,
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Skadden Arps or any
one or more of its clients, nor do they necessarily reflect the
views of Judge Southwick.
*
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B. Oklahoma
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3. Current Operation
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III. Attempts to Eliminated Bifurcated Courts
201
A. Texas
201
B. Oklahoma
202
IV. Analysis
202
V. Conclusion
202
On April 29, 2014, Clayton Lockett was executed
by lethal injection in Oklahoma.1 Lockett was convicted
of murdering nineteen-year-old Stephanie Neiman,
whom he shot twice with a shotgun and then buried while
still alive, with the help of his accomplices.2 Of his own
volition,3 Lockett confessed three days later and was
subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. Lockett’s
death resulted from a botched lethal injection.4 The drugs

Jeffrey E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton
Lockett, THE ATLANTIC (June 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2015/06/execution-clayton-lockett/392069/.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See id. (“Governor Fallin gave a press conference to remind
everyone about Lockett’s crimes, voice her support for the
1
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used to execute Lockett were both confidential and
experimental.5 The intravenous line (“IV”) used to render
Lockett unconscious was pulled from his vein and became
infiltrated, and much of the lethal drugs did not make it
into Lockett’s bloodstream.6 As a result, Lockett awoke
and sat up on the gurney in the middle of his execution,
unable to speak, with blood pooling beneath him caused
by the infiltrated IV.7 The execution was botched to such
a level that the warden actually tried to stop it,
eventually calling and briefing the governor on the
situation.8 However, there were already enough drugs in
Lockett’s system; he died ten minutes later, apparently
in agony the entire time.9
Prior to this incident, on April 23, 2014, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court dissolved a stay of execution
and rendered a per curiam opinion that resulted in
Lockett’s execution.10 Lockett v. Evans is the result of
more than ten years of interrelated appeals and
constitutional challenges, spanning federal courts of
appeals and state courts of last resort.11 Lockett’s later
appeals, challenging a lethal injection disclosure
prohibition statute, also included Charles Warner, a man
death penalty, and announce an investigation into what had
gone wrong.”).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. (“Ten minutes later, at 7:06 p.m., Clayton Lockett was
declared dead. He had been dying amidst all the chaos, just
very slowly and in apparent agony.”).
10 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 492 (Okla., 2014) (“The stay
of execution entered by this Court on April 21, 2014, is hereby
dissolved.”).
11 See, e.g., Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2013);
Lockett v. Workman, No. CIV-03-734-F, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157157 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2011); Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d
58 (Okla. 2014); Warner v. State, 29 P.3d 569 (Okla. Crim. App.
2001).
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facing execution for raping and murdering an elevenmonth-old baby.12 The state of Oklahoma executed
Warner on January 15, 2015,13 after a 180-day stay of
execution during which authorities investigated the
botched execution of Lockett.14 Warner’s last words were,
“My body is on fire.”15
Warner’s and Lockett’s appeal process was unique
because they challenged the constitutionality of a law
that classified the lethal injection drugs used to execute
them.16 If Warner and Lockett succeeded in their
constitutional challenge, their executions would be
stayed. In forty-eight states, there would be no question
that a court of last resort could render a decision on the
constitutionality of a lethal injection classification law.
Oklahoma, however, is not one of them, due to its
bifurcated court of last resort structure. The only other
state that maintains a bifurcated structure of civil and

Diana Baldwin, Man Found Guilty of Baby Rape, Murder,
NEWSOK (June 24, 2003), http://newsok.com/man-foundguilty-of-baby-rape-murder/article/1934580.
13 Cary Aspinwall, Charles Warner is Executed, TULSA WORLD
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/charleswarner-is-executed-here-s-the-story-of-his/article_af39c54208d0-5bd6-80ac-01a6f1c668ee.html.
14 Katie Fretland, Oklahoma Agrees to 180 Day Stay of
Execution for Death-row Inmate, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/oklahoma180-day-stay-execution-charles-warner. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals issued the stay of execution for Mr.
Warner, rather than the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id.
15 Sean Murphy, Charles Warner Executed: Baby Killer Says
‘My Body Is On Fire’ During Lethal Injection In Oklahoma,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2015/01/15/charles-frederick-warner-executed_n_6483040.html.
16 Lockett, 356 P.3d at 61 (“The appeal by the DOC and its
interim Director has placed the issue of the secrecy provision
of section 1015(B) undisputedly within this Court's appellate
jurisdiction.”).
12
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criminal courts of last resort is Texas.17 This Article
explores the history of Texas’s and Oklahoma’s
bifurcated courts of last resort, the similarities and
differences between the two systems, as well as some of
the controversies that have arisen due to jurisdictional
questions. The Article concludes with a recommendation
that Oklahoma and Texas each adopt a unified court of
last resort.
When cases arise that implicate both civil and
criminal issues, the Oklahoma and Texas judiciaries are
likely to suffer from “judicial hot potato,” by sending the
cases back and forth between the criminal and civil
divisions of the respective court.18 That is not to say,
however, that questions of jurisdiction do not arise in
unified systems, such as the United States federal courts.
The key difference there lies in the vesting of a single
court, rather than dual courts, with the final decision on
whether a case is civil or criminal in nature. Although no
system is perfect, by adopting a unified court of last
resort, Texas and Oklahoma will have a single decisionmaker with a clear grant of jurisdiction to determine the
classification of cases.

LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA
220 (1939) (“[N]o state in the Union except Texas and
Oklahoma has a separate court of criminal appeals.”); see also
Ben L. Mesches, Bifurcated Appellate Review: The Texas Story
of Two High Courts, 53 JUDGES’ J. 4 (2014).
18 The colloquial phrase “hot potato” is defined as “a
controversial question or issue that involves unpleasant or
dangerous consequences for anyone dealing with it.” Hot
Potato, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/hot%20potato. The phrase derives from the popular
children’s party game in which participants toss to each other
a small object resembling a potato while music is playing. See
generally JACK MAGUIRE, HOPSCOTCH, HANGMAN, HOT POTATO
& HA HA HA: A RULEBOOK OF CHILDREN’S GAMES (1990). When
the music stops playing, the player holding the object is
eliminated and cannot proceed to the next round. Id.
17
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I. History
Both Texas’s and Oklahoma’s court structures
have evolved over time, becoming the labyrinths they
remain today. Political motivations and increased case
volume have contributed to the byzantine network of trial
and appellate courts that Texas maintains. In Oklahoma,
large-scale reforms were achieved in the wake of scandal,
but those reforms failed to address the problems inherent
in bifurcated courts of last resort. Both states have failed
to eliminate their bifurcated structures throughout their
history, despite attempts to do so.
A. Texas
1. Pre-Civil War
Texas became a republic in 1836,19 after declaring
independence from Mexico.20 Texas’s first judiciary as an
independent nation had a single supreme court composed
of a chief justice and associate justices.21 The associate
justices were judges of the district courts and functioned
as the supreme court when a majority was present, which
constituted a quorum.22 These provisions were in the
original draft of the constitutional convention of 1836 as
well,23 likely indicating that the judiciary was not a
contested issue throughout the convention.

REP. OF TEX. CONST. pmbl. (1836).
TEX. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1836).
21 REP. OF TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–9 (1836).
22 Id. § 7.
23 JOURNALS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE FREE, SOVEREIGN, AND
INDEPENDENT PEOPLE OF TEXAS, IN GENERAL CONVENTION,
ASSEMBLED 821–904 (H.P.N. Gammel, ed., Gammel Book Co.
1898) (1836).
19
20
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In 1845, the United States annexed Texas.24 With its
annexation, Texas adopted a state constitution.25 The
new constitution changed the structure of the judiciary,
with three justices (one chief justice and two associate
justices) sitting on the supreme court, any two of whom
would constitute a quorum.26 The 1845 Constitution
specifically granted habeas corpus jurisdiction to the
Texas Supreme Court, a power it did not retain in the
1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas.27 In addition,
the 1845 Constitution gave district courts original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases, which those courts did
not retain under the 1836 Constitution.28
In 1861, Texas seceded from the United States and
ratified a new constitution upon joining the Confederate
States of America.29 Notably, the 1861 Secession
Constitution did not come with changes to the judicial
department, however. The Constitution of 1861 kept the
judiciary provisions in Article IV, and even maintained
the same sections.30 Texas became a member of the
Confederate States of America on March 23, 1861, when
the Secession Convention adjourned for the last time.31
2. Reconstruction
After the Civil War, Texas began a tumultuous
period of constitutional change in its judiciary. During
Reconstruction, Texas was subject to federal military
C.T. Neu, Annexation, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE (Sept. 23,
2015), https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mga02.
25 Id.
26 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1845).
27 Id. § 3.
28 Id. § 10.
29 JOURNAL OF THE SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS 8
(William Winkler, ed., 1912) (1861).
30 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1–5, 10 (1861).
31 Walter L. Buenger, Secession Convention, HANDBOOK OF
TEXAS ONLINE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.tshaonline.org/
handbook/online/articles/mjs01.
24
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occupation and ousted all five supreme court justices on
September 10, 1867.32 Between 1866 and 1876 Texas had
three different constitutions.33
a. Constitution of Texas (1866)
The Constitution of 1866 was written in order to
regain admittance to the Union. Among other changes,
the Constitution of 1866 significantly changed the
structure of the Texas judiciary. Section 1 of Article IV
added new constitutional courts (courts created by the
constitution) including criminal courts, county courts,
and corporation courts.34 The county courts had original
jurisdiction in “all misdemeanors and petty offences, as
the same are now, or may hereafter be defined by law; of
such civil cases, where the matter in controversy shall
not exceed five hundred dollars.”35 The Constitution of
1866 also added justices of the peace, whose jurisdiction
is further defined by law, and who had jurisdiction in civil
matters totaling less than $100.36
The Constitution of 1866 also added two more
justices to the Texas Supreme Court, for a total of four
associate justices and one chief justice.37 The appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court changed slightly in
1866. Formerly, the supreme court had appellate
jurisdiction that extended to all matters, but the
legislature could limit appellate jurisdiction in criminal
cases and interlocutory judgments.38 In the 1866
Hans W. Baade, Chapters in the History of the Supreme Court
of Texas: Reconstruction and “Redemption” (1866-1882), 40 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 17, 25 (2008).
33 TEX. CONST. art. V (1876); TEX. CONST. art. V (1869); TEX.
CONST. art. IV (1868); TEX. CONST. art. IV (1866).
34 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1866).
35 Id. § 16.
36 Id. § 19.
37 Id. § 2.
38 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1861).
32
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Constitution, the legislature could no longer limit felony
criminal jurisdiction from the supreme court through
law.39 The Constitution of 1866 also provided for the
election of district judges and expanded their jurisdiction
beyond that of the Constitution of 1861 to include
appellate jurisdiction from the inferior courts, original
jurisdiction in cases dealing with slander or libel, and
suits for the trial or title to land.40
b. Constitution of 1869
Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution of
1866, Winfield Scott Hancock, the military commander
over Texas during Reconstruction, called for an election
in Texas to determine whether a new constitution should
be created.41 Texans overwhelmingly voted for a new
constitutional convention, and the convention assembled
on June 1, 1868.42 The convention lasted 150 days but the
delegates did not complete a constitution.43 Nonetheless,
what was written was submitted to the voters of the state
and became the Constitution of 1869.44
The judicial department, particularly the Texas
Supreme Court, was significantly changed in the
Constitution of 1869. The supreme court was reduced to
three justices45 who were subjected to nine-year term
limits, rather than the ten-year terms under the
Constitution of 1866.46 The district court judges retained
appellate jurisdiction of inferior courts.47 The county
TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1866).
Id. § 6.
41 Claude Elliot, Constitutional Convention of 1868-69,
HANDBOOK
OF
TEXAS
ONLINE
(June
12,
2010),
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mjc04.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 TEX. CONST. art. V, § II (1869).
46 Id.
47 Id. § VII.
39
40
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courts were merged with the justice of the peace courts,
the extent of their jurisdiction to be delineated by the
legislature.48
c. Constitution of 1876
The Constitution of 1876 is the current
constitution of Texas, but it has been amended numerous
times since its ratification in 1876.49 The Constitution of
1876 differed greatly from the Constitution of 1869. It
included, as constitutional requirements, a supreme
court, a court of appeals, district courts, county courts,
commissioners’ courts, courts of justices of the peace, and
other courts that may be established by law.50 The
Constitution of 1876 also gave the legislature the ability
to establish specifically criminal district courts as long as
the city had over 30,000 residents.51 The Texas Supreme
Court remained a three-justice court,52 but, critically, its
jurisdiction over criminal matters was eliminated. The
supreme court had civil appellate jurisdiction only,
reaching only the cases in which the district courts had
original or appellate jurisdiction.53 With the absence of
criminal jurisdiction, the supreme court also lost the
ability to issue writs of habeas corpus.
The Constitution of 1876 created the Texas Court
of Appeals, possibly in response to a congested docket.54
Contrary to its usual nomenclature, the court of appeals
was not an intermediate appeals court. Rather, it had
exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal matters, as well as
Id. § XX.
See, e.g., TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT
ONE, THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL
OVERVIEW 3–5 (1990).
50 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1876).
51 Id.
52 Id. § 2.
53 Id. § 3.
54In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 379 (Tex. 2011).
48
49
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some civil cases arising from the county courts.55 The
court of appeals was also elected every six years and
consisted of three sitting judges.56
There are multiple theories for the bifurcation of
civil and criminal jurisdiction between the Texas
Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Appeals.57 Most
hold the view that the courts’ jurisdiction was bifurcated
due to a backlog of cases.
Others hold the view that the Constitution of 1876
was a “revanchist document: The fruition of a resurgence
of state power by segregationist, mostly ex-Confederate
Democrats
after
a
decade
under
Union-run
Reconstruction.”58 The resurgence of state power by
segregationists allowed the Texas Democrats to change
the constitution in order to bypass a “radical Republican”
reconstruction court.59 This new court would allow the
Democrats to ignore odious precedent laid down by the
Texas Supreme Court, further reinforced by the fact that
in the new constitution only the Texas Court of Appeals
could hear habeas petitions during a time of martial
law.60 The state could now avoid a reconstruction court
when trying to enforce Jim Crow laws.61
Either way, the bifurcated system failed to
achieve what the drafters wanted. By 1879, the courts
continued to fall behind in their caseloads, and the
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1876).
Id. § 5.
57 See Maurice Chammah, Bill Renews Debate on Merging Top
Two Courts, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://www.texastribune.org/2012/12/13/bill-merge-highestcourts-brings-back-old-debate/; Scott Henson, Caveats to
Debate on Merging Texas Supreme Court, Court of Criminal
Appeals, GRITS FOR BREAKFAST (Dec. 13, 2012, 11:00 AM),
http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2012/12/caveats-todebate-on-merging-texas.html.
58 Henson, supra note 57.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
55
56
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legislature created a commission of appeals.62 This too
failed, and by 1891, the citizenry of Texas voted to
entirely supplant the judicial article of the Constitution
of 1876.63
3. Amendments to 1876 Constitution
a. 1891 Amendment
In 1891, the state of Texas adopted a wholesale
replacement of its judiciary through an amendment.64
The 1891 amendment removed the Texas Court of
Appeals and replaced it with the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.65 Thus, the
new system added a mid-level appeals court and gave the
Texas Supreme Court the responsibility of resolving
conflicts between the courts of civil appeals.66
The Texas Supreme Court maintained its limit of
three sitting justices, as did the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals.67 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals was also
composed of three judges per court.68 After adopting the
1891 amendment, the Texas legislature added two more

James T. Worthen, The Organizational & Structural
Development of Intermediate Appellate Courts in Texas, 1892–
2003, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 33, 34 (2004).
63 Id. at 35.
64 See generally S.J. Res. 16, 22d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1891).
65 Id. § 1.
66 Id. Additionally, it is important to note that the 1891
amendment gave the Texas Supreme Court the ability to issue
writs of habeas corpus, which had not been present in the
Constitution of 1876. S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex.
1891); see also Tex. Const. art. V § 3 (1876). The 1891
amendment also explicitly eliminated the use of the writ of
mandamus by the Texas Supreme Court against the Governor.
S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex. 1891).
67 S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. at §§ 2, 4 (Tex. 1891).
68 Id. § 6.
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courts of appeal.69 The term limits remained six years for
each justice and judge, with each elected by popular
vote.70 No additional courts were changed by the 1891
amendment.71
The next set of constitutional amendments
affecting the judiciary did not occur until 1954.72 That
does not mean, however, that there were no legislative
changes to the judiciary. Between 1893 and 1967, Texas
added eleven new appellate districts.73 The further
constitutional changes were concerned, primarily, with
the supreme court and the court of criminal appeals.
Before addressing these changes, I will briefly describe
what has occurred at the trial court level since 1876.
b. Trial Courts in Texas
Texas has a dizzying array of trial courts.
Constitutional trial courts include district, county, and
justice of the peace courts. There are currently 507
district courts across the state.74 Unfortunately, the
legislature, in an effort to deal with changing caseloads,
has created statutory district courts that have specific
jurisdictional preferences.75 Thus, a litigant will have to
determine the correct district court in which to bring her
W.O. Murray, Our Courts of Civil Appeals, 25 TEX. B.J. 269,
270 (1962).
70 S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. at §§ 2, 4, 6 (Tex. 1891).
71 There still remained district courts, county courts,
commissioner’s courts, and courts of justices of the peace. S.J.
Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Tex. 1891).
72 TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXAS
CONSTITUTION SINCE 1876 65–70 (Feb. 2016).
73 See Worthen, supra note 62 at 36.
74
State District Courts, TEXAS STATE DIRECTORY,
https://www.txdirectory.com/online/dist/ (last visited on Dec. 2,
2016).
75 TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT ONE, THE
TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 30
(1990).
69
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claim, even though she may live within the geographical
confines of multiple district courts. Litigation in Texas is
further confused by the existence of the county courts,
which consist of statutory county courts and
constitutional county courts.76 Statutory county courts
actually have no common thread: They are simply a
patchwork creation of local judicial needs.77 There is no
commonality among them. Constitutional county courts
are required in each county, where the judge is the chief
executive officer of the county. A county court judge is not
constitutionally required to be an attorney, and she has
limited jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases.78
Finally, there are the justice of the peace courts.
These courts have varying jurisdiction by statute and
primarily operate as small claims courts and cases
involving traffic fines.79 Only about eight percent of the
justices of the peace are lawyers,80 yet justice of the peace
courts are responsible for a significant portion of state
revenue.81
There are many other forms of trial courts in
Texas, but the subject is beyond the scope of this Article.82
It is enough to know that the Texas judicial system
includes a confusing mass of overlapping jurisdictions
and courts, oftentimes run by non-lawyers. The existence
of this patchwork only adds to the confusion of litigants.
As will be discussed later, litigants struggle already in
Id. at 41, 45.
Id. at 41–43.
78 Id. at 48.
79 Id. at 49.
80 In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 383 (Tex. 2011).
81 TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT ONE, THE
TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 49
(1990).
82 For more information on Texas’s judicial system, see
Guittard, infra, note 84; 2010 Annual Report for the Texas
Judiciary, OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 2010),
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/454879/2010-AnnualReport2_25_11.pdf.
76
77
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the quest for the proper trial court. Bifurcated courts of
last resort only add to the confusion and headache faced
by litigants, especially when they do not know which
appeals court has jurisdiction in their case.
c. Amendments Since 1891 Regarding the
Structure and Function of the Appellate
Courts in Texas.
In 1945 Texas increased the size of its supreme
court from three to nine justices.83 In 1966, Texas
increased the criminal court of appeals from three to five
members.84 Then, in 1977 the criminal court of appeals
increased to nine sitting judges.85 The court of appeals
has also changed significantly since 1891, including the
addition of criminal jurisdiction.
In 1978, Texas adopted a constitutional
amendment allowing for more than three members on
the court of civil appeals.86 In 1980, the criminal backlog
was so great that the average disposition of a criminal
appeal was three years.87 The resulting constitutional
amendment gave the court of appeals appellate
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal appeals, except
death penalty cases.88 This system is how the Texas
appellate courts operate today. There are fourteen
appellate districts, with varying numbers of judges on
each court. This appellate court has both civil and
criminal jurisdiction, with the sole exception of death
penalty cases. The Texas Supreme Court and Texas
S.J. Res. 8, 49th Reg. Sess. TEX. CONST. amend. art. V, § 2
(Tex. 1945).
84 Clarence Guittard, The Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals,
14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 549, 551 (1983).
85 Id. at 552.
86 Worthen, supra note 62 at 38.
87 Guittard, supra note 84, at 552.
88 S.J. Res. 36, 66th Reg. Sess. TEX. CONST. amend. art. V, §§ 5,
6 (Tex. 1979).
83
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Court of Criminal Appeals each have nine justices and
exercise only civil or only criminal jurisdiction,
respectively. The stopgap legislation and patchwork
courts in Texas used to alleviate backlogs of cases has led
to the jurisdictional issues which will be taken up in Part
II, infra.
B. Oklahoma
1. 1907 Constitution
The original judiciary article of the Oklahoma
Constitution, ratified in 1907, provided specifically for a
supreme court, district courts, county courts, courts of
justices of the peace, municipal courts, and allowed for
the creation of a criminal court of appeals.89 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court maintained criminal
jurisdiction as long as there was not a statutorily created
criminal court of appeals.90 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court was composed of five justices, divided into five
judicial districts, nominated by political parties, and
voted for by the state in an at-large election.91 The term
of office was six years.92
District courts were courts of general jurisdiction,
and divided into twenty-one districts.93 County courts
were specifically for probate, matters in controversy less
than $1,000, and misdemeanors.94 County courts were
also courts of appeals for justice of the peace courts.95
Justice of the peace courts had concurrent jurisdiction
with county courts, but for less money, and lesser
offenses.96
OKLA. CONST. art. VII § 1 (1907).
Id. § 2.
91 Id. § 3.
92 Id.
93 Id. §§ 9, 10.
94 Id. §§ 12, 13.
95 Id. § 14.
96 Id. § 18.
89
90
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The first criminal court of appeals was created in
the 1907–1908 session of the Oklahoma legislature,
which was the first legislative session of Oklahoma.97
This act gave the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals
exclusive criminal appellate jurisdiction, with the
exception that the Oklahoma Supreme Court was to
make determinations of constitutionality, should they
arise.98 The 1909 legislature perpetuated the criminal
court of appeals, repealed all prior acts in conflict, and
gave it exclusive appellate jurisdiction of criminal
matters.99 The 1909 act created three judicial districts,
and provided for general elections of the judges.100 In
1959, the legislature changed the name of the Oklahoma
Criminal Court of Appeals to the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals.101
2. 1967 Amendment to the 1907 Constitution
There were other changes along the way, but in
1967, in response to serious criticism and cries for reform,
Oklahoma adopted a new judicial system.102 According to
Dean Earl Sneed of the University of Oklahoma Law
School, the judicial system of Oklahoma by the 1960s
was, “ancient, creaky, inefficient, outmoded, complex,
costly, and antiquated.”103 He further stated that the
system “was not good in 1907, and has grown
progressively worse in the fifty-eight years since
statehood[.]”104 While Oklahoma’s appeals courts
History of the Court, OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS (2014), http://www.okcca.net/History.html.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Earl Sneed, Unfinished Business or All the Way in
One Play, 19 OKLA. L. REV. 5, 6 (1966) (expounding his
dissatisfaction with the system of justice in Oklahoma).
103 Sneed, supra note 102, at 7.
104 Id.
97
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remained largely unchanged since 1907, its lower courts
were a mess by the 1960s. Dean Sneed provided an
anecdote that illustrates the frustrating complexity of the
lower court system.
Fred [a research assistant to Dean Sneed]
produced seven pages of legal size, single
spaced material with just the most basic
facts about our court system. It would have
been longer, but I told Fred that because of
the virtual impossibility of the task, he
should omit any detail about police and
municipal courts and courts of specialized
jurisdiction such as the juvenile court in
Tulsa County, and that he should just
mention the superior and common pleas
courts which exist only in a few counties in
Oklahoma. And of course, since Fred did
that work in 1954, we have created small
claims courts, the children's court in
Oklahoma County, the aforementioned
special session courts, and city courts. I
have added three more pages to Fred's
work.105
At the appellate level, Dean Sneed’s derision of the
Oklahoma court system focused on judicial appointment
and selection, judicial salaries, and centralized
rulemaking power.106
One central impetus for the revision of the
Oklahoma judiciary was the scandal of the 1960s. It came
to be known that from the 1930s until the 1950s, Justice
N.S. Corn, along with possibly four other justices, took
bribes in exchange for dispositions in supreme court

Id. at 10.
Phillip Simpson, The Modernization and Reform of the
Oklahoma Judiciary, 3 OKLA. POL. 1, 6 (1994).
105
106
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cases.107 The scandal came to a head in 1956, with a
$150,000 bribe in the Selected Investment case.108 In July
of 1964, Justice Corn was sentenced to eighteen months
in prison.109 Justice Welch was also sentenced to prison,
and Justice Johnson was impeached.110 In 1966,
Oklahoma adopted a court on the judiciary.111
The battle for reform was hardly over. Once it was
clear that reform was necessary, Dean Sneed and the
legislature went to work.112 Dean Sneed would have to go
to the voters with an initiative petition in order to bypass
the legislature.113 During this time, anti-reformers were
ousted in the election of 1966.114 The Sneed plan was
submitted to the voters, but the legislature had already
devised its own reform plan.115 The voters rejected
Sneed’s plan, but reform was ultimately achieved
through the legislature.116
In July 1967, the constitutional provisions that
repealed and replaced the 1907 Article VII of the
Oklahoma Constitution were approved.117 “The two most
significant changes . . . [to Article VII were the creation
of] one state trial court of general jurisdiction[,] and . . .
[the creation of a judicial system] under the supervision
and control of the [S]upreme Court.”118 The Article

Id.
Id. See generally Selected Invs. Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n,
309 P.2d 267 (1957).
109 Simpson, supra note 106, at 7.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 8.
112 Id. at 8–9.
113 Id. at 9.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 9–12.
116 Id. at 12.
117 George B. Fraser, Oklahoma’s New Judicial System, 21
OKLA. L. REV. 373 (1968).
118 Id. Note that although the Oklahoma Supreme Court is the
highest court, it still does not maintain jurisdiction in criminal
107
108
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further provides that justices of the supreme court and
court of criminal appeals shall be nominated by a
commission and appointed by the governor,119 and that
other judges are selected through a non-partisan
election.120 The constitution kept the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court
was to have the final say regarding jurisdiction if a
disagreement between the supreme court and the court
of criminal appeals arose.121
3. Current Operation
Oklahoma’s judiciary currently includes four
courts of limited jurisdiction, one trial court of general
jurisdiction, one civil appeals court, and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court and Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals as courts of last resort.122
The four courts of limited jurisdiction are
statutory courts.123 They include the Workers’
Compensation Court of Existing Claims, the Court of Tax
Review, the Municipal Courts not of Record, and the
Municipal Courts of Record.124 The workers’
compensation court and Court of Tax Review are
appealable directly to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The
Municipal Court not of Record is appealed to the district
court.125 The Municipal Court of Record is appealable
matters. Criminal appeals still only go to the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
119 OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 4.
120 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
121 Id. § 4. Unfortunately, as will be discussed infra, the court
of criminal appeals does not always follow the jurisdictional
mandates of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
122 The Oklahoma Judicial Center, Supreme Court Brochure
(2016), http://www.oscn.net/oscn/schome/fullbrochure.htm.
123 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
124 The Oklahoma Judicial Center, supra note 122.
125 Id.
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directly to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.126
District court decisions can be appealed to both the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, depending on whether the matter is
civil or criminal.127
The civil appellate court in Oklahoma operates
differently than most judicial systems. The constitutional
amendment of 1967 allowed for the adoption of an
intermediate appellate court, and the resulting statute
requires the appeal to go to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, which then may assign appeals to the
intermediate courts unless otherwise provided by
statute.128 In other words, all appeals go to the supreme
court, which then decides which cases it gives to the court
of civil appeals. All decisions by the court of civil appeals
are final unless the Oklahoma Supreme Court grants
certiorari.129 The court of civil appeals currently has four
divisions, each with three judges. Two divisions are in
Tulsa County and the other two are in Oklahoma
County.130
The courts of last resort in Oklahoma are set up
differently than they are in Texas because Oklahoma
places ultimate power to decide jurisdictional conflicts in
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.131 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court is composed of nine members coming

Id.
Id.; see also OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
128 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
129 Id. The statutes governing the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals can be found in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 30.1 (West
2017).
130 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 30.2 (West 2017). This law
became effective in 1982. 5 OKLA. PRAC., APPELLATE PRAC. §
1:26 (2016 ed.).
131 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. Texas courts of last resort are
coequal, which can result in instances where jurisdiction is
contested and there is no resolution. See discussion infra Part
II.A.
126
127
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from nine different districts.132 The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals maintains exclusive jurisdiction in
criminal appeals,133 and is composed now of five
members.134
II. Current Issues in Jurisdiction
Both Texas and Oklahoma suffer from “judicial
hot potato,” where the courts of last resort either fight
over jurisdiction to hear a case, or pass a case back and
forth until the case is either dismissed or forced upon one
of the courts. This usually results from hard cases that
have both civil and criminal aspects. Below, I will provide
examples of different cases that resulted in “judicial hot
potato” in each of the states’ courts of last resort, and
compare issues, where relevant, to the federal system.
A. Texas
This section will explore a few examples that
demonstrate the issues caused by Texas’s bifurcated
court structure. These cases involve contempt,135 a civil
exercise of a stay of execution,136 appeals from property
forfeiture orders in criminal prosecution,137 and the
exercise of equity jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of
arguably unconstitutional penal laws.138 In the analysis
section, I will tie together the when and why of these
jurisdictional tangles.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1- 2 (West 2017).
Id. § 40 (West 2017).
134 Id. (West 2017). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is
composed of nine members. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.112
(West 2017).
135 In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011).
136 Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 88
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
137 Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
138 Texas v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
132
133
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The primary drawback in a bifurcated court of last
resort system is determining which courts get which
cases when there are both civil and criminal aspects. In
Texas, an illustrative example of this situation occurred
in In Re Reece.139 In Reece, the Texas Supreme Court
grappled with the question of whether a litigant can be
held in contempt for perjury committed during a
deposition.140 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
refused to grant habeas review because the case that
gave rise to the contempt order was civil.141 The Texas
Supreme Court held that it could exercise mandamus
jurisdiction because the relator did not have an adequate
remedy by appeal, precisely because there was not a
criminal appeals court that would hear his habeas
petition.142
The Texas Supreme Court can only exercise
habeas jurisdiction when “the contemnor’s confinement
is on account of a violation of an order, judgment, or
decree previously made in a civil case.”143 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, on the other hand, maintains
general habeas jurisdiction.144 The law giving the Texas
Supreme Court habeas jurisdiction was designed to keep
civil trials on the civil side of the bifurcated courts.145
Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to
hear the relator’s habeas petition, and the Texas
Supreme Court did not have habeas jurisdiction because
there was not a violation of a specific court order, the
relator claimed he was without adequate remedy by
appeal.146

341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011).
Id. at 362.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 369 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(e)).
144 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5.
145 See Tex. S.B. 36, 29th Leg., R.S. (1905).
146 Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 369.
139
140
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The Texas Supreme Court, through statutory
construction and reliance on prior case law, determined
that mandamus jurisdiction was broad enough to cover
instances in which an individual was wrongly held in
contempt.147 Because the statute in question grants
broad mandamus jurisdiction, and because there was no
prohibition on the use of mandamus to free someone from
confinement, the court reasoned that mandamus
jurisdiction was permissible.148 Ultimately, because the
Texas Supreme Court found that the underlying case
here was civil and there was no habeas jurisdiction, there
was no adequate remedy by appeal, and thus mandamus
jurisdiction could be used.149
Justice Willett’s dissent is the most informative
aspect of this case for this Article’s purposes, because he
outlines many of the flaws in Texas’s bifurcated court
system.150 Justice Willett noted the court of criminal
appeals’ “lateral[ed]” to the Texas Supreme Court
because they mistakenly believed that the supreme court
had habeas jurisdiction in this case.151 The supreme court
agreed, 9-0, that there was not habeas jurisdiction.152 The
Id. at 373–75.
Id; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a).
149 Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 376.
150 See id. at 378–402 (Willett, J., dissenting). Justice Willett
begins his jurisdictional diatribe with statements such as,
“Unfortunately, the juris-imprudent design of the Texas
judiciary does not make the list. Today's case is a byproduct of
that recondite web, sparking a game of jurisdictional hot potato
between us and our constitutional twin, the Court of Criminal
Appeals.” Id. at 378.
151 Id. at 378 n.1. (“Although this Court does have the authority
to act in this case pursuant to Article 5, § 5, of the Texas
Constitution, we decline to do so. Effective 1981, Article 5, §
3(a) of the Texas Constitution was amended to give the Texas
Supreme Court and the Justices thereof the authority to issue
writs of habeas corpus.”) (quoting In re Reece, No. WR–72,199–
02, slip op. at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 29, 2009)).
152 See id. at 378.
147
148
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point Justice Willett made was that even the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, the state court of last resort for
criminal cases, made a mistake navigating the judicial
labyrinth that Texas created.
Justice Willett also pointed out how difficult this
jurisdictional issue was (and continues to be) for
litigants. There is a stock letter informing litigants that
the Texas Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in a
particular area, directing them to re-file in the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals.153 Justice Willett described
other instances, discussed infra, in which there have
been jurisdictional quandaries between the two courts of
last resort.154
When Justice Willett arrived at the heart of the
immediate case, he argued that the Texas Supreme Court
did not have jurisdiction to grant mandamus.155 Both he
and the majority recognized that the supreme court is
prohibited by statute from using habeas jurisdiction.156
Nevertheless, Justice Willett contended that using
mandamus jurisdiction as a patch to do exactly what
habeas jurisdiction entails is prohibited by statute.157
Justice Willett countered the majority’s argument that
mandamus existed because there was no adequate
remedy at law by pointing out that there was an adequate
remedy by appeal through a motion for rehearing in the
court of criminal appeals.158 Justice Willett then pointed
out the perils of deciding this case via mandamus
jurisdiction: If the court granted mandamus here, when
Id. at 380.
Id. at 384 (including a notable case dealing with antisodomy laws in 1992).
155 Id. at 391.
156 Id.
157 Id. (“Where the Legislature has spoken clearly and removed
the kind of case now before us from our jurisdiction, it is
disingenuous to circumvent the rule by renaming the
remedy.”).
158 Id. at 399.
153
154
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the court of criminal appeals also has habeas jurisdiction,
litigants will be unsure of the proper court in which to
file.159 Finally, Justice Willett pointed to the issue of a
civil court hearing cases in which the appeal arises from
a criminal penalty.160 The Texas Supreme Court
acknowledged that the bifurcation issue between civil
and criminal cases is determined by the nature of the
court’s punishment.161 Justice Willett concluded his
dissent with some judicial “shade-throwing,”162 by
stating, “At the very least (and it grieves me to use these
six words) Texas should be more like Oklahoma” by
vesting one court with final determination of
jurisdictional questions.163
It is important to note that the distinction
between civil and criminal contempt in federal court can
also be a difficult line to draw. My argument throughout
is that a bifurcated system takes a difficult question and
Id. (“Similarly, this case leaves open the question of whether
and when a petitioner may seek review in both courts, and in
what order. Such confusion could lead to an unnecessarily
increased docket in either court, or at least wasted resources
spent shuffling cases between the two systems (or discussing
whether to do the shuffle in the first place).”).
160 Id. at 401 (“Further, hearing this case, and perhaps future
cases like it, may force us to handle appeals from civil cases
with criminal penalties, and force us at least in part to take on
quasi-criminal matters.”).
161 Id. at 371.
162 See Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Apr. 16,
2015, 7:10 PM), https://twitter.com/justicewillett/
status/588887181554417664 (using “throw shade” colloquially).
See generally Linette Lopez, This is Where the Expression
‘Throw Shade’ Comes From, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/where-the-expression-throwshade-comes-from-2015-3 (describing what it means to throw
shade).
163 Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 at 402 (describing his desire for a
court that has clear authority to determine jurisdiction, similar
to what Oklahoma’s judicial system contains).
159
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makes it harder. The decision as to whether an appeal
from a contempt order is civil or criminal “drives the
process that is required, including the type of notice, the
standard of proof, the relevance of the validity of the
underlying order, and the level of intent.”164 As Judge
Hartz has noted, the way federal courts determine civil
and criminal appeals hinges upon “the essential nature
of the action, not the underlying proceeding it arose from
. . . .”165 For contempt, this means the distinction is
whether the judgment is ordered to achieve compliance
with an order or to punish.166
Texas’s habeas statute attempts to meet this
distinction by only granting habeas powers to the Texas
Supreme Court if the confinement is in violation of a
court order. An individual was found in contempt of court
for lying during a deposition, not as a result of a court
order or decree previously made. It is clear that the
purpose of the contempt order in this case was to punish.
The real problem in this case was that the underlying
civil case resulted in what appears to be a criminal
contempt judgment. Thus, the purpose was criminal, but
the underlying proceeding was civil. While the federal
system may have difficulty distinguishing between
criminal and civil contempt at times, at least the courts
and litigants know which judge or court will decide the
issue. In Texas, the status of the underlying action is
added to the mix, which means that Judge Hartz’s
observation will not provide redress to Texas state court
litigators. One must take into account both the purpose
of the order and the underlying action. And, the litigator,
without the supreme court’s creation of the mandamus
16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3950.8 (4th ed. 2016).
165 In re Special Grand Jury 89–2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1167 (10th
Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526
(4th Cir. 2000)).
166 See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369–70
(1966).
164
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loophole, would actually be without a court to appeal a
criminal contempt order arising out of civil trial.
In Holmes, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held that they could exercise mandamus jurisdiction to
prevent an appeals court from exercising civil jurisdiction
over a stay of execution pending a hearing on clemency.167
The case concerned inmate Gary Graham, who was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. This
particular case was an attempt by Graham to force the
Board of Pardon and Paroles to hear Graham’s request
for clemency through an injunction. The district court
entered an order to either provide a hearing or enjoin the
execution until the hearing occurred.168 The Board
appealed, and the court of appeals entered an injunction
preventing the execution.169 The relators (the district
attorney and the Board of Pardons and Pleas) appealed
up to the court of criminal appeals seeking a writ of
mandamus.170 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
found that the stay of execution was a criminal law
matter because capital punishment only arises from
capital murder convictions.171
Judge Meyers noted in dissent that the
controversy surrounding this case arose from the
bifurcated nature of Texas courts of last resort,172
identifying the language in the Texas Constitution that
gave rise to the confusion in this case.173 If “criminal law
Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
168 Id. at 391.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 394.
172 Id. at 418 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (“Our Constitution provides that the Supreme Court’s
‘appellate jurisdiction shall be final and shall extend to all
cases except in criminal law matters,’” while “[t]his Court, on
the other hand, has ‘final appellate jurisdiction . . . in all
criminal cases of whatever grade . . . .’” (quoting TEX. CONST.
art. V, §§ 3, 5)).
167
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matters” and “criminal cases,” as used in the state
constitution, mean the same thing, then the court of
criminal appeals would have exclusive jurisdiction.174
But if they mean something different, then it is possible
that there is overlapping jurisdiction with civil courts.175
Judge Meyers suspected that the majority of the court
refused to allow this case to go through a normal appeal
process for fear of it being appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court instead of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
and thus stepped in to prevent that possibility.176 Judge
Meyers ended his dissent with a scathing statement
regarding the jurisdictional warfare that he accused the
majority of waging:
Our entire manner has had the
appearance of a guerilla raid, when it
should instead have been a cooperative
effort to construe fundamental aspects of
Texas constitutional law. In the process,
we have violated basic principles of our
own mandamus jurisprudence, encouraged
the misuse of habeas corpus, and
shamelessly interrupted an appellate
process which was running exactly as
prescribed by law, and which might very
well have produced results better than
expected by the majority had it been
permitted to proceed to final judgment.177
Bretz v. State, which involved an individual
acquitted of receiving and concealing stolen property and
Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885
S.W.2d 389, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (Meyers, J.,
dissenting).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 418–19. (stating that Judge Meyers himself is not
willing to “fight a turf war with other Texas courts”).
177 Id. at 421.
174
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ordered to return the property to the complaining
witness, provides a much simpler example.178 The
defendant in the case appealed the order to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals,179 but the court held that it
did not have jurisdiction.180 Judge Roberts concurred and
took time to expound the issues presented with
bifurcated appeals.181 Judge Roberts lamented that even
though this appeal came from a judgment in a criminal
trial governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure in
Texas, the court had to send Bretz “on his way to begin
yet another search for the proper forum,”182 which, in this
case, was the Texas Supreme Court.
In addition to forfeiture, Judge Roberts brought to
light a few other instances of the confusion litigants face
in Texas’s bifurcated court system.183 For example, bond
forfeiture proceedings are reviewed by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, yet are governed by the rules of civil
procedure.184 When a defendant seeks a writ of
mandamus to enforce his right to a speedy trial, the
defendant must file his petition for the writ in the Texas
Supreme Court, not the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
where presumably the defendant later will be able to
appeal a conviction and argue that he was denied the
right to a speedy trial.185
The federal courts face similar issues. Bond
forfeiture proceedings are civil;186 property forfeiture

Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 98 (“Further, I feel that this case presents an excellent
example of a problem often encountered in this State.”).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 98–99.
184 Id.
185 Id.; see also Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1971)
(judgment set aside on other grounds).
186 United States v. Plechner, 577 F.2d 596, 597 (9th Cir. 1978).
178
179
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proceedings are criminal.187 But in Texas, the outcomes
can be absurd. A court that has jurisdiction solely in
criminal matters must use the rules of civil procedure.
That scenario cannot exist in a unified system.
One high profile case in Texas highlighting the
problems inherent in a bifurcated court structure came
in 1994 with a challenge to Texas’s anti-sodomy law.188 In
State v. Morales, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the
Texas anti-sodomy law, a criminal statute, could be
declared unconstitutional by the Texas Supreme Court
only if it resulted in an irreparable injury to a property
right.189 The majority held that the court should avoid
construing rights concerning a penal statute and further
expressed pragmatic concerns with conflicting opinions
between the two courts of last resort, noting that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also refused to exercise
its jurisdiction in this Texas constitutional challenge.190
It is not clear why the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
declined to hear this case, although one could postulate
that because there was no criminal prosecution, the court
saw no need to take jurisdiction. As a result, the lower
court’s decision declaring the law unconstitutional was
reversed, and the matter was remanded to the trial court
to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.191 Thus, both
of Texas’s courts of last resort decided that they lacked
jurisdiction in this case. What is the point of having two
courts of last resort if neither of them can take a
particular case?
Another question arises from the Morales cases:
How might one case end up in front of both courts of last
resort? The Attorney General appealed to both courts at
the same time. The Attorney General was quoted as
United States v. De Los Santos, 260 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir.
2001).
188 State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
189 Id. at 942.
190 Id. at 948 n.16.
191 Id. at 949.
187
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saying, “We want to make sure we're not locked out of an
appeal. It was either file with both or roll the dice.”192
Even the Attorney General’s office, the law firm of Texas,
was unsure how to navigate the bifurcated court
structure.
B. Oklahoma
Oklahoma’s judiciary, although not loved by all
members of the Oklahoma bar, seems to enjoy fewer
jurisdictional quandaries than Texas as a result of the
1967 large-scale judicial reforms. However, issues still
remain with Oklahoma’s bifurcated system of courts,
including the exercise of civil jurisdiction to enjoin an
execution, juvenile delinquency, and contempt.193
The procedural paths of Clayton Lockett and
Charles Warner’s cases through the Oklahoma judiciary
form a most tangled web. Warner was convicted at trial
of first-degree murder and first-degree rape.194 The trial
court’s conviction was reversed, and the case was
remanded for a new trial.195 Warner’s second trial also
resulted in conviction for first-degree murder and firstdegree rape.196 This time, on appeal, Warner’s conviction
was upheld.197 After losing in the Oklahoma Court of
In re Coy Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 385 n.68 (Tex. 2011)
(quoting Janet Elliott, State Appeals Twice in Sodomy Case,
But Neither High Court May Want ‘Hot Potato’, TEX.
LAWYER, May 18, 1992, at 1).
193 See, e.g., Carder v. Court of Crim. App., 595 P.2d 416 (Okla.
1978) (deciding a jurisdictional issue against the determination
made by the court of criminal appeals); Ronald N. Ricketts,
Indirect Contempt in Oklahoma, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 213 (1974)
(discussing the thorny issue of the quasi-criminal nature of
contempt in a bifurcated appeal system).
194 See generally Warner v. State, 29 P.3d 569 (Okla. Crim. App.
2001).
195 Id. at 575.
196 Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 896 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).
197 Id.
192
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Criminal Appeals, Warner appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari.198 Warner then filed a
writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma.199 The writ was denied,
and Warner appealed to the Tenth Circuit, where the
district court’s decision was affirmed.200 Warner then
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the writ of
certiorari once again was denied.201
Clayton Derrell Lockett was charged with
conspiracy, first-degree burglary, assault with a
dangerous weapon, forcible oral sodomy, first-degree
rape, kidnapping, robbery by force and fear, and firstdegree murder.202 Lockett was convicted on all nine
counts and sentenced to death.203 The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court below.204
Lockett then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, where
the petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.205 Lockett
then filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, where the
writ was denied and judgment was entered against
Lockett.206 Lockett appealed to the Tenth Circuit where
the judgment was affirmed.207 Certiorari was denied by
the U.S. Supreme Court.208
Lockett and Warner then joined as plaintiffs and
filed a petition for declaratory relief and requested an
injunction against the Oklahoma Department of
Warner v. Oklahoma, 550 U.S. 942 (2007).
Warner v. Workman, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (W.D. Okla.
2011).
200 Warner v. Trammell, 520 Fed. Appx. 675 (10th Cir. 2013).
201 Warner v. Trammell, 134 S. Ct. 924 (2014).
202 Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418, 421 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
203 Id.
204 Id. at 431.
205 Lockett v. Oklahoma, 538 U.S. 982 (2003).
206 Lockett v. Workman, No. CIV-03-734-F, 2011 WL 10843368
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2011).
207 Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218, 1255 (10th Cir. 2013).
208 Lockett v. Trammel, 134 S. Ct. 924 (2014).
198
199

[193]
43

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2

Corrections on a challenge to the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma statute209 that concealed the identity of the
drugs to be used in their executions.210 The Oklahoma
Attorney General’s Office removed the case to the United
States District Court, due to Lockett and Warner’s
invocation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.211 Lockett and Warner then amended their
complaint to remove federal issues, and the case was
remanded back to the Oklahoma district court.212 The
Oklahoma district court then found that jurisdiction for
issuing a temporary injunction lays solely in the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.213 Plaintiffs
appealed the trial court’s order finding jurisdiction lays
solely in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.214 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court remanded the declaratory judgment matter to the
trial court for resolution of civil matters, and transferred
the emergency stay of execution motion to the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals.215 During this time, however,
the state of Oklahoma was unable to procure execution
drugs, and thus a thirty-day stay was entered and the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the
emergency stay motion as moot.216
The district court then ruled on the declaratory
judgment and
found
the confidentiality
law
unconstitutional under the Oklahoma Constitution as a
See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 1015(B) (2011) (“The
identity of all persons who participate in or administer the
execution process and persons who supply the drugs, medical
supplies or medical equipment for the execution shall be
confidential and shall not be subject to discovery in any civil or
criminal proceedings.”).
210 Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 58, 58 (Okla. 2014).
211 Id. at 59.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 60.
209
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denial of the plaintiffs’ right to access the courts.217 The
plaintiffs then sought a stay of execution pending the
appeal of the district court’s declaratory judgment.218 The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, however, denied
the stay of execution, holding that it may only issue a stay
of execution pending a challenge to conviction or sentence
of death.219 The plaintiffs again appealed to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, which exercised jurisdiction
in deciding the constitutional question220 but ruled that
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals maintained
jurisdiction to issue a stay of execution.221 Thus, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court—per its constitutional
authority—instructed the court of criminal appeals to
take jurisdiction.222 Unfortunately, this was not the end
of the judicial hot potato.
Upon receiving the case from the Oklahoma
Supreme Court for a second time, and after a clear
pronouncement of jurisdiction from that court, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to exercise
its jurisdiction and held:
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
authority to deem an issue civil and so
Id.
Id.
219 Lockett v. State, 329 P.3d 755, 759 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014).
Note the similarity to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal’s
denial of review in Reece. Because the appeal arose out of a civil
matter, the Reece court denied relief.
220 Lockett v. Evans, 377 P.3d 1254, 1254 (Okla. 2014).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 1254–55 (“In exercising our constitutional power to
determine jurisdiction, we transfer ‘only’ the Application for
Emergency Stay to the Court of Criminal Appeals. In so doing,
we urge the appellate criminal court to be cognizant of the time
restraints associated with the submission of the appeal(s) to
this Court along with the gravity of the first impression
constitutional issues this Court will be charged with in
addressing the civil appeal, or appeals.”).
217
218
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within its jurisdiction, it does not have the
power to supersede a statute and
manufacture jurisdiction in this Court for
Appellants’ stay request by merely
transferring it here. Therefore, Appellants’
application for stays of execution is
DENIED.223
In response to the court of criminal appeals’ refusal to
exercise its jurisdiction, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
wrote:
On April, 17, 2014, Thursday
last, we exercised our constitutional
authority to determine the appropriate
tribunal for resolution of the stay issue
under the Oklahoma Constitution, Article
7, section 4, vesting this Court with the
sole power to determine whether the
jurisdiction of the stay issue was within
this Court or the Court of Criminal
Appeals. In so doing, we transferred the
request for stay “alone” to the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
The majority of the Court of
Criminal Appeals refused to exercise this
Court's order and to address the merits of
the stay. That order, which we consider to
be invalid as not having followed the
constitutional directive of this Court, have
[sic] now resulted in a situation never
contemplated
by
the
drafters
of
Oklahoma's ultimate rule of law—that this
tribunal be inserted into death penalty

223

Lockett, 329 P.3d at 758.
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cases. A position generally reserved for the
Court of Criminal Appeals.224
As a result, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined
that the rule of necessity required them to take
jurisdiction in this case to issue a stay of execution
pending the outcome of the civil challenge to the
confidentiality statute.225 For the first time in the state’s
history, the Oklahoma Supreme Court took jurisdiction
in a death penalty appeal.226 Unfortunately, the stay of
execution was not the end of the matter.
In the final opinion issued before the executions of
Lockett and Warner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
appeared to backpedal. The supreme court reversed the
trial court’s decision, which held section 22.1015(B)
unconstitutional.227 The supreme court also dissolved its
stay of execution.228 The concurrence rings of “I told you
so,” when Justice Taylor writes:
I warned this Court in my previous
dissents against crossing the Rubicon and
now that crossing has caused a quagmire.
Had this Court transferred all issues in
this appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeals as I previously advocated, the
matter would have been resolved without
this Court ignoring precedent and the
Court of Criminal Appeals’ role in our
judicial system.229

Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (Okla. 2014) (emphasis in
original).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 62 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
227 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 491 (Okla. 2014).
228 Id. at 492.
229 Id. at 493 (Taylor, J., concurring).
224
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Why did the court experience such a rapid aboutface regarding these jurisdictional issues? Between the
opinion issuing a stay of execution on April 21, 2014, and
the opinion dissolving the stay of execution on April 23,
2014, some unusual events transpired in the governance
of Oklahoma. First, Governor Mary Fallin proclaimed
that she would not comply with the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s stay of execution, stating, “I cannot give effect to
the order by that honorable court.”230 Let that sink in:
The executive branch of Oklahoma refused to comply
with the stay of execution issued by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, and would execute the inmates
regardless, by reasoning that the supreme court’s
“attempted stay of execution is outside the constitutional
authority of that body” and that only an order by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would be binding
in this case.231 The next day Representative Mike
Christian of the Oklahoma legislature began
impeachment proceedings against the justices in the
majority opinion issuing the stay of execution.232 As a
result, the supreme court reversed its position and
allowed the executions to proceed, despite the secrecy of
the drugs—the very same drugs that caused Warner’s
last word to be, “My body is on fire.”233
What ultimately caused this jurisdictional hot
potato was the insertion of a civil suit into a death row
case. The Oklahoma Supreme Court felt compelled by
necessity to enter the “quagmire” of a suit requesting a
stay of execution in order to decide the constitutional
implications of the government’s policy forbidding
disclosure of the lethal injection drugs. Events like this
could not occur in the federal system. Every Article III
Andrew Cohen, Oklahoma Just Neutered its State Supreme
Court, THE WEEK, (Apr. 29, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/
447457/oklahoma-just-neutered-state-supreme-court.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Murphy, supra note 15.
230
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court has the authority to decide the entire controversy
(subject to subject matter jurisdiction) regardless of the
civil or criminal aspects. A federal court may struggle to
determine which rules of procedure may apply, but there
is no question as to which court has the ability to hear a
case. While the story of Charles Warner and Clayton
Lockett is certainly a dramatic example of the pitfalls of
bifurcated courts of last resort, there are others that
generate less controversy.
In Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the court of criminal
appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition,
a demand for a change of custody hearing for a juvenile
who had been adjudicated delinquent and a ward of the
state.234 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals does not have
general supervisory jurisdiction of lower courts, and
cannot hear cases that do not arise out of criminal
matters.235 It is important to note that had this appeal
originated from an adjudication of delinquency or
certification to stand trial as an adult, the result would
have been different. But because the matter was instead
a subsequent court action where the father sought to
return his son to his custody, there was no longer court of
criminal appeals jurisdiction.
A jurisdictional tug-of-war between the Oklahoma
Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals that remains unresolved is that of contempt,
which, as already noted, has aspects of both criminal and
civil jurisdiction. Contempt, according to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, is sui generis and not criminal. In the
federal system, contempt can be either criminal or civil.
The distinction lies in whether the purpose is to punish
or to induce compliance.
In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Owens, the
dispute arose out of the contempt conviction of a certain
234
235

595 P.2d 416, 418 (Okla. 1978).
Id. at 419.
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Mr. O. O. Owens, who published defamatory statements
about some of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
members.236 From a federal perspective, the purpose was
to punish Mr. Owens for his statements. Owens filed a
habeas petition with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals after being found in contempt by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.237 The supreme court directed a writ of
prohibition to the court of criminal appeals regarding the
habeas petition, but the court of criminal appeals
proceeded anyway and ordered Owens’s release.238 Once
again, here is an instance in which the constitutionallysuperior Oklahoma Supreme Court is defied by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. One can hardly
blame the court of criminal appeals, however, because
the punishment of Mr. Owens for his defamatory
statements appears to be criminal through any lens.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court subsequently
quashed the order of release in Dancy v. Owens.239
Fortunately, in this case—juxtaposed with the Lockett v.
Evans saga—the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
did not act in further contravention of the holding of the
supreme court.240 Less fortunate is the fact that there
still remains jurisdictional confusion with regard to
contempt because the court of criminal appeals held that
contempt is a misdemeanor in Roselle v. State241 and the
supreme court still maintained that contempt is sui
generis in Young v. Woodson.242 As noted above in my
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Owens, 256 P. 704, 705 (Okla.
1927).
237 See Ricketts, supra note 193, at 216.
238 See generally Ex parte Owens, 258 P. 758 (Okla. Crim. App.
1927).
239 258 P. 879 (1927).
240 See Ricketts, supra note 193, at 217 (noting that it was not
until forty years after Dancy that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court once again addressed contempt).
241 503 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
242 519 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1974).
236
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discussion of contempt in Texas, it is often difficult to
determine whether contempt is civil or criminal. But once
again, the difficulty is exacerbated when two courts of
last resort have to decide the question.
III. Attempts to Eliminate Bifurcated Courts
A. Texas
Texas has not been silent in its desire to eliminate
the bifurcated court system. There have been four
distinct proposals in the past twenty years to eliminate
the bifurcated court system, some introduced more than
once.243 The 1993 effort proposed to eliminate the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals and transfer all criminal cases
to the Texas Supreme Court. A 1999 proposal would have
merged the two courts into one high court composed of
fifteen justices: seven would be appointed by the
governor, seven would be elected, and the chief justice
would be appointed and had to be from a different district
than the previous appointment.244 In 2003, the proposal
was substantially the same as 1993—eliminate the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals and transfer jurisdiction to
the Texas Supreme Court.245 In 2011 and 2013, the same
bill to eliminate the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was
introduced.246 Unfortunately, none of the bills presented
received any real consideration.247

Bill Raftery, Trying to Eliminate the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals: Will Fourth Attempt in 20 years Succeed?,
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Dec. 6, 2012), http://gaveltogavel.us/
2012/12/06/trying-to-eliminate-the-texas-court-of-criminalappeals-will-fourth-attempt-in-20-years-succeed/.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 See id. (noting that only a few bills even received a hearing).
243
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B. Oklahoma
Oklahoma, despite the controversies it has
endured, has had far less legislative attempts to
eliminate its bifurcated court structure. Although it has
been criticized on record as early as 1919 at a meeting of
the Oklahoma State Bar Association,248 there have only
been two instances of proposed reforms since the Sneed
plan in 1967.249 One was an attempt to create a third
court of last resort specifically for capital cases.250
Oklahoma’s other attempt to modify its court structure
occurred in 2012; the proposal called for the elimination
of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals as well as the
transfer of the power of constitutional review by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court to an ad hoc court of
constitutional review created by the legislature.251
IV. Analysis
A bifurcated court system causes unique
jurisdictional “quagmires.” Bifurcating criminal and civil
jurisdiction is usually intuitive and simple in the vast
majority of cases, but there are enough significant issues
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
OKLAHOMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 126 (Walter Lybrand,
ed.1919) (discussing a wholescale replacement of the
Oklahoma judiciary, including a single supreme court).
249 See Simpson, supra note 106 (noting that the Sneed plan
was defeated).
250 H.R.J. Res. 1022, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015)
(introduced by the same individual who introduced articles of
impeachment against the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
response to the Lockett debacle).
251 See S.J. Res. 83, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2012); Bill Raftery,
Recent Legislative Efforts to Eliminate, or Create, Bifurcated
Criminal and Civil Appellate Courts, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Apr. 30,
2014), http://gaveltogavel.us/2014/04/30/recent-legislative-effortsto-eliminate-or-create-bifurcated-criminal-and-civil-appellatecourts/.
248
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to justify greater scrutiny of the system. Oklahoma and
Texas are the only two states in the union that maintain
this judicial system. No other state (including those with
large populations such as California, New York, and
Florida) maintains a bifurcated system of courts of last
resort. If the overwhelming majority of states and the
federal system maintain a single court of last resort,
there might be good reason for Oklahoma and Texas to
consider following the crowd.
Texas and Oklahoma suffer from failures to
distinguish between civil and criminal jurisdiction in
cases that maintain aspects of both. These cases create
confusion for litigants as well as inter-judicial warring.
Texas and Oklahoma do not have a compelling
justification for maintaining bifurcated courts and should
either combine the two courts into one, or develop a
bifurcated system of intermediate appellate courts, with
one court of last resort that has full appellate jurisdiction
for all matters.
When one looks at the cases listed in Part II, one
can find a unifying theme in the jurisdictional
quandaries in which these courts have found themselves.
In every single case outlined above, there have been
aspects of both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In re Reece
involved contempt in the context of a civil deposition.252
This case arose out of a civil case, but was essentially a
habeas petition, which the Texas Supreme Court
generally cannot hear.253 However, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals refused to hear the habeas petition
because it determined the case was civil in nature,
arising from a civil case.254 In Oklahoma, contempt
jurisdiction is still unresolved. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court determined that contempt is sui generis,255 but the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided that
In Re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011).
Id.
254 Id. at 362.
255 Young v. Woodson, 519 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1974).
252
253
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contempt is a misdemeanor and thus under its sole
jurisdiction.256
One might point to the federal system and suggest
that contempt is a difficult distinction even for a unified
court system.257 This underscores my point. If it is
difficult for a single court, it is even more complicated for
a bifurcated system. At the end of the process, at least
the litigant has the promise of finality in a unified
system. The U.S. Supreme Court can make a
determination and it will be the end of the matter. In
Oklahoma and Texas, the litigant still does not know! If
past performance is evidence of future conduct, Texas’s
and Oklahoma’s high courts will play judicial hot potato
again.
Other examples where the federal courts have
struggled to determine the difference between civil and
criminal jurisdiction include: appeals from criminal
forfeiture,258 appeals from firearms prohibitions imposed
on felons,259 and appeals from denials of requests to
release grand jury transcripts for use in a habeas
proceeding.260 In each of these cases there are aspects of
both civil and criminal jurisdiction, yet the firearms
appeals and the jury transcript requests were both held
to be civil and the forfeiture of assets appeal was held to
be criminal. In Texas and Oklahoma, the supreme court
must think about how the court of criminal appeals would
rule, and vice versa, in order to prevent jurisdictional
holes or gaps from propagating. Reece is a perfect
example. The Texas Supreme Court had to contort its
Rosell v. State, 503 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827–28 (1994).
258 United States v. De Los Santos, 260 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir.
2001).
259 Palma v. U.S., Dept. of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 228
F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2000).
260 United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.
1993).
256
257
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jurisdiction to meet a gap in habeas jurisdiction.261 At
least unified systems will generate an answer that will
effectively guide litigants, and keep them from having to
“roll the dice.”262
Litigants themselves struggle to navigate the
system. In State v. Morales,263 the Attorney General of
Texas appealed to both the Texas Supreme Court and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, not knowing which
court had jurisdiction. In Bretz v. State, a litigant
appealed an order to return property that he was
acquitted of stealing.264 One could reasonably assume
that because the order came from a criminal trial, the
appeal would be to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Unfortunately, Texas maintains that this appeal belongs
in a civil appeals court, not criminal. Texas does follow
the federal rule,265 but in Texas, one has to file an entirely
new motion and appeal to an entirely different court if
the original appeal was brought in the wrong court. In
federal court, a litigant could simply amend her motion
and remain in front of the same court.
Because it is difficult to determine which court of
last resort has jurisdiction, litigants have to expend more
resources identifying the appropriate appellate forum,
and judicial resources are wasted determining which
court has jurisdiction. The Lockett/Warner debacle is a
perfect example: A case was bounced around for years
with the courts fighting over who did or did not have
jurisdiction.
Texas and Oklahoma have experienced interjudicial warring because of their bifurcated court
structures. In re Reece is an example where the Texas
Supreme Court essentially had to step in and take
In Re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011).
See supra note 192.
263 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
264 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
265 See, e.g., United States v. Madden, 95 F.3d 38, 39 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1996).
261
262
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jurisdiction because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
refused.266 In Oklahoma, Lockett v. Evans passed in front
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court six times after being
sent to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on
multiple occasions.267 In Texas, it is understandable that
the courts of last resort must tread lightly in deferring to
the other court. The two courts are coequal, both provided
for in the constitution and both with final appellate
jurisdiction in their respective spheres.268 In Texas there
is no ultimate authority to decide jurisdictional mistakes.
If both courts deny jurisdiction, there is no court to hear
the case. This is a serious problem that could only be
resolved through a constitutional amendment, because
interpretation of jurisdiction is a constitutional matter.
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has the
constitutional power to decide final jurisdictional issues,
it appears to be illusory. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
made a final adjudication in Lockett v. Evans, holding
that the court of criminal appeals had jurisdiction, yet
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to
exercise its jurisdiction in that case.269
Thus, we find that the expense and headache
created by the bifurcated system is not worth the candle.
The system is inefficient, confusing, and contentious. The
arguments in favor of the system are dispelled below.
The argument that Texas and Oklahoma require
bifurcated courts to handle a more significant caseload is
not a compelling one. For instance, the California
Supreme Court received 9,739 matters in 2013.270 By
comparison, the Texas Supreme Court received only 778
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals received 5,875,
See supra Part II.A.
Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 493 (Okla. 2014) (Taylor, J.,
concurring).
268 See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2–3, 5.
269 Lockett, 330 P.3d 488.
270 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2013 CALIFORNIA COURT
STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS xvi (2013).
266
267
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for a total court of last resort case disposition of 6,653
matters.271 This shows that California, with one court,
was able to complete 3,086 more matters than Texas with
two courts. Oklahoma, being a far less populous state,
also cannot justify its bifurcated system based on the
number of matters disposed.
The argument that a bifurcated court of last resort
system increases the expertise of the judiciary does not
outweigh the problems such a system creates. There is
little evidence to suggest that federal courts suffer from
a lack of expertise in disposing of criminal or civil
matters, except for the occasional issue such as ERISA or
patent litigation.272 Even if Oklahoma and Texas want to
keep their expert judges in criminal and civil matters,
they could do so through specialized mid-level appeals
courts, which I will outline infra.
In light of these jurisdictional issues and the
examples from the vast majority of other states, my
recommendation is that both Texas and Oklahoma
should abolish their bifurcated court system. There
should be three constitutional courts including a trial
court of general jurisdiction, an appeals court with
general appellate jurisdiction, and one supreme court
with general appellate jurisdiction. This would require
the elimination of the current system in Oklahoma where
the Oklahoma Supreme Court handles all appeals and
has discretion in passing appeals down to the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals.
OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2013 24, 30
(2013).
272 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition Insights Into
Judicial Decisionmaking in Employee Benefits Cases, 3 LAB. &
EMP. L. F. 2 (2013) (arguing for specialized judges to handle
ERISA litigation); William Watkins, We Need a Specialized
Patent
Trial Court,
LAW 360
(Oct.
20,
2014),
http://www.law360.com/articles/583409/we-need-aspecialized-patent-trial-court.
271

[207]
57

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2

Texas would eliminate a significant number of its
own courts, including county courts and justice of the
peace courts. I also recommend that Texas reduce the
total number of courts of appeal from the current
fourteen to a more manageable six or seven. Texas should
increase the number of judges on the courts of appeal,
and limit the districts to readily discernable geographic
and demographic areas. This will decrease the role of the
Texas Supreme Court as an arbiter of district splits and
allow it to grant certiorari on appeals that present novel
and important issues.
If, on the other hand, Texas and Oklahoma would
like to maintain the specialization in having a bifurcated
appeals system, there is still room to clean up the
jurisdictional conflicts. In the late 1960s, Tennessee and
Alabama both instituted bifurcated mid-level appellate
courts.273 Neither state has attempted to amend or
eliminate its system in the past twenty years.274
There are numerous benefits of a bifurcated midlevel appeals court with a single court of last resort. The
mid-level appeals courts would develop significant
specialties in their respective jurisdiction, thus
maintaining one of the principal arguments in favor of
the bifurcated courts of last resort while decreasing
jurisdictional headaches. The courts would have less
work, and thus could reach a disposition more quickly.275
Additionally, the supreme court may come to be viewed
as playing more of an administrative role, with the midlevel courts acting similar to a court of last resort. I
See Raftery, supra note 243 (listing both Alabama and
Tennessee as states that have bifurcated mid-level appellate
courts).
274 Id.
275 For example, Tennessee’s mid-level courts of appeal
maintained near or above a 100% clearance rate. See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE TENNESSEE JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2013‐2014 11, 13
(2014).
273
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would, however, allow mandatory supreme court
jurisdiction for death penalty cases due to the incredibly
sensitive nature of those cases.
The mid-level court would in most instances be
the last court that litigants see. Without a right of appeal
to the supreme court (except in capital cases), the midlevel appeals courts would have final authority on nearly
all decisions. Only in cases where the supreme court
either finds serious errors in reasoning, circuit splits, or
jurisdictional mistakes would it review a case. Thus,
these specialized courts would for most purposes remain
the last court to which litigants argue.
If there are questions regarding jurisdictional
issues between the mid-level courts (which, as we have
seen from bifurcated courts of last resort, is inevitable)
the supreme court could easily dispose of the
jurisdictional issue and the lower courts would be bound.
There would be no debacles like Reece or Lockett because
the supreme court would have ultimate authority on all
issues of state law.
For example, if we apply the novel mid-level
bifurcated structure to the facts of Reece, where the Texas
Supreme Court used a tenuous interpretation of its
mandamus power to prevent a significant gap in
appellate review, there would have been a different
outcome.276 If the mid-level court of criminal appeals
denied jurisdiction, the civil appeals court would likely
have never entered the picture. The appeal of the denial
of habeas would go up to the unified supreme court of last
resort, where that court presumably would have
determined that the court of criminal appeals did have
jurisdiction in this case. Because the unified supreme
court is a higher court and sets binding precedent for the
court of criminal appeals, that court would have heard
the case and disposed of the issue.
Cases like Bretz v. State would also be avoided.
Litigants would have the knowledge that if a mistake
276

See supra Part II.A.
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concerning jurisdiction was made on their part, the
supreme court could remand to the proper court.
Additionally, when the mistaken jurisdiction of the
litigant is clear to the mid-level court reviewing the case,
Texas and Oklahoma could institute a process similar to
the process set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1631.277 This would
allow a civil court to transfer a case to a criminal court
and vice versa.278 The result would be preservation of the
case to avoid timing issues in appeals. Further, if there
were a mistake on the part of the transferring court, the
supreme court would have the authority to make a final
determination and remand for adjudication. There would
still remain extra expense in litigation, but there also
would be the added benefit of judicial expertise in
specialized courts.
One might question whether the outcome of
Lockett would have been any different in a system of
bifurcated intermediate courts. I argue that it would. On
the first appeal, Lockett would appeal to either the
criminal or civil court of appeals. If he appealed to the
wrong court, or the court incorrectly determined that it
did not have jurisdiction, the case would be appealed up
to the unified supreme court. This court would be able to
make a single determination regarding which court had
jurisdiction, and its decree would be binding law on all
parties. There would not be the denial of the order by the
court of criminal appeals because the unified supreme
court is objectively higher. Even if the mid-level court of
criminal appeals defied the order of the unified supreme
court (which is highly unlikely), the supreme court would
have jurisdiction to decide the case itself, thus
eliminating the tenuous judicial acrobatics necessary to
shoehorn civil into criminal, or vice versa. As Justice
Jackson famously wrote, “We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are

277
278

28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982).
Id.

[210]
60

JUDICIAL HOT POTATO
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 161 (2018)

final.”279 One court of last resort eliminates a contest of
equals jockeying for position and creates finality binding
on all.
V. Conclusion
“Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice
is as old as law. Not to go outside our own legal system,
discontent has an ancient and unbroken pedigree.”280 The
Texas and Oklahoma judiciary systems are problematic.
In Oklahoma, the result of a judicial hot potato led to the
botched execution of a convicted murderer using
experimental drugs.281 In Texas, the Texas Supreme
Court used mandamus jurisdiction for what was
essentially a habeas petition, because the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear a writ of habeas corpus arising from an individual
being held in contempt in an underlying civil trial,
despite the fact that the purpose of the contempt order
was criminal punishment.282 These jurisdictional issues
affect real human beings and deserve the attention of
legislators and reformers. Texas and Oklahoma should
seriously consider amending their constitutions to
reconstruct their judicial systems to contain only one
court of last resort with general appellate jurisdiction in
order to ensure there will always be a court to hear a case.

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J.
concurring).
280 Orley R. Lilly, Jr., Some Thoughts for Judicial Reform in
Oklahoma, 10 TULSA L. J. 91, 91 (1974) (quoting Roscoe Pound,
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice (1906)).
281 See Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488 (Okla. 2014).
282 See In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011).
279
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ARTICLE

THE DECLINE OF CIVIL
DISCOURSE AND THE RISE OF
EXTREMIST DEBATE
WORDS MATTER
Timothy W. Conner*
Most attorneys are familiar with the adage: “If the
facts are against you, argue the law. If the law is against
you, argue the facts. If the law and the facts are against
you, pound the table and yell like hell.”1 We have entered
Timothy W. Conner has served as a judge on the Tennessee
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board since August 1, 2014.
Prior to that, Judge Conner practiced law for twenty-two years
in the areas of workers’ compensation, workplace exposure
claims, wills and estates, and employment discrimination. He
has been an Adjunct Professor at The University of Tennessee
College of Law since 2013, where he teaches the course on
Workers’ Compensation Law. He received his bachelor’s degree
from Boston University in 1988, cum laude with distinction,
and his Juris Doctor from Wake Forest University School of
Law in 1992. The opinions expressed in this article are those of
Judge Conner individually and are not intended to reflect the
collective opinion of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Board.
1 This adage derives from CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES
181 (1937) (“‘If the law is against you, talk about the evidence,’
*
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an age where, in any given debate, proponents of a
particular position no longer seem to care about the facts
or the law. They bypass all reason, attempt no civil
discourse, and proceed straight to yelling. This proclivity
knows no political, generational, or socio-economic
bounds. It is an equal-opportunity philosophy that
threatens to tear down the very foundations on which our
representative republic was built; for when the objective
of the discourse is simply to shout down the other side,
very little of substance can be accomplished. Why have
we digressed to this point? Can we change course and reintroduce the vital concept of respect for well-reasoned
opinions, even if they are diametrically opposed to our
own? Is it too late to salvage human dignity in the public
sphere?
In my tenth-grade debate class, we discussed the
elements of an effective argument. We learned that great
debaters were the ones who had a good grasp of the facts,
understood both sides of an argument, and methodically
laid a foundation in support of their position. Ineffective
debaters were the ones who did not understand the facts,
relied on unsubstantiated sources, and, more often than
not, attacked the other side’s motives and character,
neither of which is relevant to the substance of the issues
being debated. Attacking your opponent, we were told, is
a sure sign of your own weakness.
Despite this maxim of debate, individuals across
a range of professions, socio-economic groups, and
political parties have no reservations about using the
“yell like hell” philosophy as the first, and sometimes
only, course of action. Whether they are politicians,
comedians, musicians, or authors, they have filled the
public forum with anger, accusations, unfair generalities,
and unfounded conclusions about the character of “the
said a battered barrister. ‘If the evidence is against you, talk
about the law, and, since you ask me, if the law and the
evidence are both against you, then pound on the table and yell
like hell.’”).
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other side.” They oppose the other side’s positions not on
merit, but on their hatred of “the other side.” A few recent
examples illustrate the escalating problem: (1) a
presidential candidate accused another nation of
“bringing drugs, and bringing crime, and their rapists” to
America;2 (2) another presidential candidate, though
acknowledging ahead of time that her comment would be
“grossly generalistic,” stated that half of the supporters
of the other candidate belonged in a “basket of
deplorables;”3 (3) a California political leader led a
profane chant against the President while he and a crowd
of supporters used a profane gesture;4 (4) a late-night
comedian used his national platform to insult the
President with a series of escalating comments too
offensive to reprint here;5 (5) a musician included in his
concert a message displayed in giant letters across
several large video screens disparaging the President;6
and (6) following a terrorist attack in London in June
Adam Gabbatt, Donald Trump’s Tirade on Mexico’s ‘Drugs
and Rapists’ Outrages U.S. Latinos, THE GUARDIAN (June 16,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/16/
donald-trump-mexico-presidential-speech-latino-hispanic.
3 Angie Drobnic Holan, In Context: Hillary Clinton and the
‘Basket of Deplorables’, POLITIFACT (Sept. 11, 2016),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/sep/11/
context-hillary-clinton-basket-deplorables/.
4 Peter W. Stevenson, California Democrats Give Trump the Finger,
WASH. POST (May 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2017/05/22/california-democrats-give-trump-thefinger/?utm_term=.68888af76d0e.
5 Sarah Taylor, Stephen Colbert Eviscerates Donald Trump in
Vulgar, Insult-Laden Network TV Rant, THE BLAZE (May 2,
2017),
http://www.theblaze.com/news/2017/05/02/stephencolbert-eviscerates-donald-trump-in-vulgar-insult-ladennetwork-tv-rant/.
6 William Cummings, What Blew Up the Liberal and
Conservative Media Bubbles This Week, USA TODAY (June 1,
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/
2017/06/01/this-week-trending-liberal-conservative-posts/
102355218/.
2
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2017, a Louisiana congressman posted in a Facebook
message that “radicalized Islamic suspect[s]” should be
denied entry into America and that we should “[h]unt
them, identify them, and kill them. Kill them all.”7 I could
continue ad nauseum, because there are any number of
websites dedicated to documenting the ridiculing of
various individuals or groups, including climate
scientists on one side or the other, politicians of all kinds,
celebrities, those of various religious faiths, and many
others.8
The advent of social media has compounded the
problem. The perceived potential to communicate, quite
literally, to the entire technology-connected world is an
intoxicant many cannot resist. This potential inflates
one’s sense of self-importance and emboldens one to say
or write whatever it takes to “go viral.” This desire
naturally leads to extremism because a well-reasoned,
Ken Stickney, Louisiana Congressman on Radicalized Islam:
‘Kill
Them
All’,
USA
TODAY
(June
5,
2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/
06/05/louisiana-congressman-radicalized-islam-kill-themall/102519398/.
8 I would be remiss in not acknowledging that, sometimes,
actions speak louder than words. Within a forty-eight hour
period of the initial drafting of this article, I noted one celebrity
who posed for photographs holding a likeness of the
decapitated, bloody head of the President, see Libby Hill, Kathy
Griffin Shocks in Gory Photo Shoot with Donald Trump’s (fake)
Head, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
entertainment/la-et-entertainment-news-updates-may-kathygriffin-shocks-in-gory-photo-1496183372-htmlstory.html,
while another individual hung a noose inside the National
Museum of African American History and Culture. Lorraine
Boissoneault, Noose Found in National Museum of African
American History and Culture, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 31,
2017), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/
noose-found-national-museum-african-american-history-andculture-180963519/). Each act oozes the kind of vitriol that
suppresses thoughtful discourse on important issues.
7
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calm, methodical approach rarely rises to the top of a
search engine result. In a recent example, a host on a
prominent cable news network responded to a tweet from
the President with his own tweet using vulgar language
and calling the President “an embarrassment to
America,” “a stain on the presidency,” and “an
embarrassment to humankind.”9 The host later
apologized, but not before his tweet went viral.10
Moreover, the ability of any individual or group to
create its own “publication” at little cost and disseminate
it widely has led to the predominance of extreme
language and “fake news.” Many such websites, blogs,
posts, and other similar media have no need of and no use
for journalistic integrity. These new media, in turn, cause
once-respected news organizations to lean toward
extreme fringes in an effort to compete with the more
sensationalistic elements on the internet. This pushes
venerated reporters to blur the line between fact and
opinion. In short, the media is caught in a “spin cycle”
that will not slow down. The perceived demand for
constant access to new and salacious news stories means
that in-depth investigative journalism, which mandates
a time-consuming, methodical approach to interviewing
and verifying sources, is shunted to the side in favor of
whatever rumor or innuendo is the “flavor of the
moment.” Owners and stockholders of legitimate media
demand revenue; revenue is generated by advertisers
who require ratings and increased subscription bases,
which apparently are generated only through “gotcha”
headlines, unverified speculation, and outrage. We, the
consumers, watch, click on, purchase, and download this
drivel. And on it goes.

Josh Feldman, CNN Host Reza Aslan Apologizes for Calling
Trump a ‘Piece of Sh*t’, MEDIAITE (June 4, 2017),
https://www.mediaite.com/online/cnn-host-reza-aslanapologizes-for-comments-calling-trump-a-piece-of-sht/.
10 Id.
9
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One commentator summarized his thoughts on
this topic in a recent article:
[W]e’re moving toward two Americas—one
that ruthlessly (and occasionally illegally)
suppresses dissenting speech and the
other that is dangerously close to believing
that the opposite of political correctness
isn’t a fearless expression of truth but
rather the fearless expression of ideas best
calculated to enrage your opponents.
. . . For one side, a true free-speech
culture is a threat to feelings, sensitivities,
and social justice. The other side waves
high the banner of “free speech” to
sometimes elevate the worst voices to the
highest platforms—not so much to protect
the First Amendment as to infuriate the
hated “snowflakes” and trigger the most
hysterical overreactions.11
What does the decline in civil discourse have to do
with the law? Consider the impact extreme language has
had on national immigration policy. In International
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,12 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit framed the issue
as follows: “whether [the Constitution] protects Plaintiffs’
right to challenge an Executive Order that in text speaks
with vague words of national security, but in context
drips with religious intolerance, animus, and

David French, David French: The Threat to Free Speech,
COMMENTARY MAG.
(June
27,
2017),
http://www.
commentarymagazine.com/politics-ideas/david-french-threatfree-speech/.
12 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. granted and stayed in part,
137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated as moot, No. 16-1436, 2017 U.S.
LEXIS 6265 (Oct. 10, 2017).
11
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discrimination.”13 The case addressed President Trump’s
executive orders that seek to prohibit “foreign nationals
who ‘bear hostile attitudes’ toward [America]” from
entering the country for a certain period of time.14 In
analyzing whether the plaintiffs could pursue a cause of
action to stop the implementation of these orders, a
majority of the Fourth Circuit found it relevant and
probative to consider “public statements by the President
and his advisors and representatives at different points
in time, both before and after the election and President
Trump’s assumption of office.”15 After recounting various
public statements in which President Trump described
“hatred [and] danger coming into our country,”16 and
claimed that “Islam hates us,”17 the court agreed with the
plaintiffs’ claim that there was an “anti-Muslim message
animating [the second executive order].”18
Following an extensive review of what the court
believed to be binding precedent on the constitutional
issue, the majority concluded that if the plaintiffs make
“an affirmative showing of bad faith” that is “plausibly
alleged with sufficient particularity” against the
government’s proposed action, then the court may “‘look
behind’ the challenged action to assess its ‘facially
legitimate’ justification.”19 The court then determined
that it must “step away from our deferential posture and

Id. at 572.
Id.
15 Id. at 575.
16 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 7, 2015,
1:47 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
673982228163072000?lang=en.
17 857 F.3d at 576.
18 Id. at 575–76, 576, 578.
19 Id. at 590–91 (quoting Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141
(2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
13
14
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look behind the stated reason for the challenged action.”20
The court noted that
Plaintiffs point to ample evidence that
national security is not the true reason for
[the second executive order], including,
among other things, then-candidate
Trump’s numerous campaign statements
expressing animus towards the Islamic
faith; his proposal to ban Muslims from
entering the United States; his subsequent
explanation that he would effectuate this
ban by targeting “territories” instead of
Muslims directly; the issuance of [the first
executive order], which targeted certain
majority-Muslim nations and included a
preference for religious minorities; [and]
an advisor’s statement that the President
had asked him to find a way to ban
Muslims in a legal way. . . .21
The court then concluded that “Plaintiffs have
more than plausibly alleged that [the second executive
order’s] stated national security interest was provided in
bad faith . . . .”22 Although the court acknowledged that it
could not engage in “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s
heart of hearts,”23 it had a duty to consider “the action’s
‘historical context’ and ‘the specific sequence of events
leading to [its] passage.’”24 Moreover, the court
determined that “as a reasonable observer, a court has a
‘reasonable memor[y],’ and it cannot ‘turn a blind eye to
Id. at 591.
Id.
22 Id. at 592.
23 Id. at 593 (quoting McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S.
844, 862 (2005)).
24 Id. at 593 (alteration in original) (quoting Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987)).
20
21
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the context in which [the action] arose.’”25 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that
[t]he evidence in the record, viewed from
the standpoint of the reasonable observer,
creates a compelling case that [the second
executive order’s] primary purpose is
religious.
Then-candidate
Trump’s
campaign statements reveal that on
numerous occasions, he expressed antiMuslim sentiment, as well as his intent, if
elected, to ban Muslims from the United
States. For instance, on December 7, 2015,
Trump posted on his campaign website a
“Statement
on
Preventing
Muslim
Immigration,” in which he “call[ed] for a
total and complete shutdown of Muslims
entering the United States until our
representatives can figure out what is
going on” and remarked, “[I]t is obvious to
anybody that the hatred is beyond
comprehension. . . . [O]ur country cannot
be the victims of horrendous attacks by
people that believe only in Jihad, and have
no sense of reason or respect for human
life.”26
In response to the Government’s arguments that
the stated purpose of the executive order was secular in
nature, that it banned persons of all religions from the
designated countries, and that it did not ban Muslims
from countries other than the designated countries, the
majority commented that the executive order’s “practical
operation is not severable from the myriad statements
explaining its operation as intended to bar Muslims from

25
26

Id. (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866).
Id. at 594.
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the United States.”27 Regardless of one’s political
perspective, religious views, or thoughts on the legal
analysis employed by the Fourth Circuit, there can be no
doubt that the primary focus of this important legal case
was on one thing: language.28 A candidate’s use of words
that some considered ill-advised and inflammatory
resulted in a United States Court of Appeals blocking
implementation of an executive order that otherwise
constituted a facially legitimate exercise of executive
discretion. Words matter.
Though certainly not on the same scale as
International Refugee, other recent litigation has hinged
on the ill-advised use of words. In 2014, a high school
student in Minnesota was suspended due to a two-word
tweet (“actually yes”) he sent off campus and after school
hours in response to a Twitter inquiry about a rumored
occurrence between the student and a teacher.29 The
student sued, alleging, among other things, that his First
Amendment rights had been violated.30 The school
district responded to the complaint by arguing that the
student’s tweet was “obscene” and therefore not protected

Id. at 597.
It should be noted that three judges on the Fourth Circuit
dissented in International Refugee, arguing that the court had
no precedential basis for “look[ing] behind” the Government’s
“‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ exercises of executive
discretion,” id. at 639 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)), and had no
just cause for “consideration of campaign statements to recast
a later-issued executive order . . . .” Id. at 639 (Neimeyer, J.,
dissenting).
29 Cyrus Farivar, Lawsuit Over Two-Word Tweet—“actually
yes”—Can Move Ahead, Judge Finds, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 15,
2015),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/08/lawsuitover-two-word-tweet-actually-yes-can-move-ahead-judgefinds/.
30 Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842,
848 (D. Minn. 2015).
27
28
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by the First Amendment.31 The district court cited
Supreme Court precedent holding that “it is a highly
appropriate function of public school education to
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public
discourse.”32 The district court concluded, however, that
the tweet in question was not patently obscene and that
the issue should be left for the jury to decide.33
Much of the debate surrounding the legal
implications of word use and word choice can be traced
back to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,34 a 1969 free speech case. Clarence
Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) leader in
rural Ohio who invited a reporter to attend a KKK rally
in 1964.35 Portions of the rally were recorded and
broadcast on a local television station and Brandenburg
was later convicted of “advocat[ing] . . . the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform . . . .”36 The
Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg’s conviction and
declared the Ohio statute on which the conviction was
based unconstitutional.37 In so holding, the Court stated,
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or

Id. at 853 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
683 (1986)).
33 Id. at 854.
34 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
35 Id. at 445.
36 Id. at 444–45 (alteration in original).
37 Id. at 449.
31
32
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producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.38
The Court then concluded:
[W]e are here confronted with a statute
which, by its own words and as applied,
purports to punish mere advocacy and to
forbid, on pain of criminal punishment,
assembly with others merely to advocate
the described type of action. Such a statute
falls within the condemnation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.39
However, there are limits to the First
Amendment’s protective reach. In 2006, the Supreme
Court of Michigan issued a controversial opinion
addressing public comments made by an attorney about
appellate judges who were hearing his client’s case.40
After the attorney obtained a large jury verdict for a
client in an earlier medical malpractice case, a threejudge panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed
the award and directed entry of a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.41 The court of appeals
commented in its decision that the conduct of the
plaintiff’s attorney during the trial was “truly egregious”
and that it “completely tainted the proceedings.”42 Within
a few days of the release of this decision, on a then-daily
radio program the attorney hosted on a local station, the
attorney made highly derogatory and offensive comments
about the three appellate court judges who issued the
Id. at 447.
Id. at 449.
40 Grievance Adm’r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 2006).
41 Id. at 129. See generally Badalamenti v. William Beaumont
Hosp.–Troy, 602 N.W.2d 854, 862 (1999).
42 Badalamenti, 602 N.W.2d at 860; see also Fieger, 719 N.W.2d
at 129.
38
39
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opinion.43 Not surprisingly, Michigan’s Attorney
Grievance Commission filed a formal complaint against
the attorney, alleging that his public comments violated
several provisions of the Michigan Rules of Professional
Conduct.44
On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court of
Michigan noted that the legal profession, unlike other
professions, “impose[s] upon its members regulations
concerning the nature of public comment.”45 “The First
Amendment implications are easily understood in such a
regulatory regime,” and the Supreme Court of Michigan
“has attempted to appropriately draw the line between
robust comment that is protected by the First
Amendment and comment that undermines the integrity
of the legal system.”46 The court concluded that “these
rules are designed to prohibit only ‘undignified,’
‘discourteous,’ and ‘disrespectful’ conduct or remarks.
These rules are a call to discretion and civility, not to
silence or censorship, and they do not even purport to
prohibit criticism.”47 The court then determined that the
attorney’s disparaging comments about the three judges
“warrants no First Amendment protection when
balanced against this state’s compelling interest in
maintaining public respect for the integrity of the legal
process.”48
Finally, the majority sought to address the
objections of its dissenting colleagues, who concluded
Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 129.
Id. at 130. The subsequent disciplinary proceedings in
Fieger, which involved an appeal to the Attorney Disciplinary
Board in Michigan, are convoluted and irrelevant to this
Article, and therefore this Article does not discuss those
proceedings. See generally id. at 130–31.
45 Id. at 131.
46 Id. at 131–32.
47 Id. at 135.
48 Id. at 142 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
43
44
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that the attorney’s disparaging public comments should
be protected by the First Amendment:
In their repudiation of “courtesy”
and “civility” rules, the dissents would
usher an entirely new legal culture into
this state, a Hobbesian legal culture, the
repulsiveness of which is only dimly
limned by the offensive conduct that we see
in this case. It is a legal culture in which,
in a state such as Michigan with judicial
elections, there would be a permanent
political campaign for the bench, pitting
lawyers against the judges of whom they
disapprove. It is a legal culture in which
rational and logical discourse would come
increasingly to be replaced by epithets and
coarse behavior, in which a profession that
is already marked by declining standards
of behavior would be subject to further
erosion, and in which public regard for the
system of law would inevitably be
diminished over time.49
Additionally, our nation’s college campuses are
increasingly marked by divisive, extreme, and abusive
language, as well as attempted censorship:
•

In 2015, a professor at the University of Missouri
attempted to prohibit a video journalist from
recording video at a student protest. The professor
yelled, “Who wants to help me get this reporter
out of here? I need some muscle over here.”50

Id. at 144.
Justin Moyer, Michael Miller & Peter Holley, Mass Media
Professor Under Fire for Confronting Video Journalist at Mizzou,
WASH POST (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
49
50
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•

In 2015, a faculty training guide distributed by
the University of California cautioned faculty
members against using words and phrases that
could result in “microaggressions,” including the
phrase “America is the land of opportunity.”51

•

A 2016 Gallup poll found that thirty-one percent
of college students say they frequently or
occasionally hear someone at their college making
“disrespectful,
inappropriate
or
offensive
comments” about others’ race, ethnicity, or
religion, while fifty-four percent of students
surveyed said the climate on their campus
“prevents some people from saying what they
believe.”52

•

In 2017, a professor at Evergreen State College
sent an email (that was then posted to Twitter)
objecting to an event called “Day of Absence,” in
which white students and teachers were asked to
leave campus for the day so that students of color
could organize and attend discussions about
race.53 Student protestors concluded the professor

news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/10/video-shows-u-of-missouriprotesters-and-journalism-professor-barring-media-coverage/
?utm_term=.7581e8f24914.
51 Nick Gillespie, This Counts as a Microaggression: “America
is the Land of Opportunity”, REASON FOUNDATION (JUNE 15,
2015),
http://reason.com/blog/2015/06/15/this-counts-as-amicroaggression-america.
52 GALLUP, FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS: A SURVEY OF U.S.
COLLEGE STUDENTS AND U.S. ADULTS 4, 18 (2016).
53 Susan Svrulga & Joe Heim, A Washington State College,
Caught Up in Racial Turmoil, Remains Closed Friday After
Threat of Violence, WASH POST (June 2, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/
06/02/evergreen-state-caught-up-in-racial-turmoil-remainsclosed-friday-after-threat-of-violence/?utm_term=.e517f9009028.
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was racist and demanded he be fired, and threats
of violence prompted the school to close for two
days.54
•

In February 2017, a professor at Fresno State
University tweeted, “to save American democracy,
Drumpf must hang. The sooner and the higher,
the better.”55

•

In 2017, two conservative commentators were
banned from the campus of DePaul University for
using “inflammatory speech.”56

•

Harvard’s campus newspaper, The Crimson,
reported in June 2017 that ten students who had
been admitted into the incoming freshmen class
had their admissions rescinded when the school
discovered sexually explicit and/or racially
insensitive memes in a private Facebook chat.57

Despite this disturbing trend, an analysis by CNN
reporter Eliott C. McLaughlin concluded that students
“will listen to speakers they disagree with if they’re

Id.
Melissa Etehad, Fresno State Professor Placed on Leave After
Tweeting “Drumpf Must Hang”, L.A. TIMES (April 19, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-fresno-professorpaid-leave-20170419-story.html.
56 Kassy Dillon, After Protests and Riots, Free Speech is MIA on
College
Campuses,
THE
HILL
(Feb.
3,
2017),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/education/317719-afterprotests-and-riots-free-speech-is-mia-on-college-campuses.
57 Hannah Natanson, Harvard Rescinds Acceptances for at
Least Ten Students for Obscene Memes, HARV. CRIMSON (June
5, 2017), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/6/5/2021offers-rescinded-memes/.
54
55
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civil.”58 He cited as an example a 2015 speech Senator
Bernie Sanders gave at Liberty University, a well-known
Christian college in Virginia. One student commented
that although she and most of her fellow students
disagreed with Senator Sanders’s views on a variety of
topics, she listened to his speech and thoughtfully
considered his comments about alleviating poverty in
light of her own beliefs, saying “[e]veryone I talked to was
glad he came,” and that “[i]t’s important to communicate
with those we disagree with.”59
Thus, there can be no doubt that the First
Amendment is the great constitutional protector of free
speech, as it should be, but it is not without its limits. For
purposes of this article, the question is not whether
divisive, rude, profane, or derogatory language is
constitutional. In most instances, it is certainly protected
speech. Instead, the question is whether, in an age where
one’s words can be disseminated immediately to millions
of people across multiple digital platforms, such language
contributes anything useful to society. As Shakespeare’s
great character Falstaff said, “The better part of valor is
discretion . . . .”60
I believe a significant majority of Americans, who
I dub the “Middle Majority,” abhor extremist, hate-filled
rhetoric, regardless of which end of the political spectrum
produces it. The average American, I maintain, finds the
vitriol spewed by white supremacists as distasteful as the
far-left’s radicalized malevolence directed at our current
President. As one commentator explained, “[r]age and
sanctimony always spread like a virus, and become

Eliott C. McLaughlin, War on Campus: The Escalating Battle
Over College Free Speech, CNN (May 1, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/campus-free-speech-trnd/.
59 Id.
60 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE
FOURTH, act 5, sc. 4.
58
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stronger with each iteration.”61 And yet, the Middle
Majority feels helpless to stop, or even slow down, this
bullet train of bitterness.
The Middle Majority does, however, hold the keys
to reversing this descent into hostility and hyperbole.
One answer, as is often the case in a capitalist society,
lies in our wallets. We can choose to weaken the impact
of extremism by refusing to buy that person’s book, or
subscribe to that magazine, or watch that television
program. We can refuse to click on that story, and, more
importantly, ignore the link to that advertiser’s website.
Companies take notice when clicks, sales, and ratings
fall. It is high time we reacted to extremists in a way that
relegates them to the shadows from whence they came.
While I will support that person’s constitutional right to
speak, I also believe in our right to react to that speech
in a way that minimizes its impact on society and opens
the door for more thoughtful, well-reasoned, civil
discourse. For those who seek a more proactive approach,
remember that advertisers crave your dollars. The
marketplace compels companies to react in a way that
maximizes profit. If enough people register disgust with
that company spokesman, or author, or You-Tuber,
advertisers will react swiftly to distance themselves from
the extremism, and the influence of the extremists will
ebb over time. It is the failure to react that leads to the
normalization of the extreme.
A second key lies in our own access to the public
forum. The Middle Majority needs to contribute to the
debate as often as possible in a way that rejects
extremism and replaces it with logic and calm, articulate
reasoning. It is not a sign of weakness to acknowledge
valid points made by those who oppose your view. It
furthers the public interest to seek common ground and
offer suggestions that move the country forward, as
Peggy Noonan, Rage is All the Rage, and It’s Dangerous,
WALL ST. J., June 17-18, 2017, at A13.
61
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opposed to the ongoing stalemate left in the wake of
dogmatic extremism. Compromise is not a four-letter
word. As one former president memorably stated, “Let us
never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to
negotiate.”62 It is high time we reject extremism of all
kinds, show respect for various viewpoints through civil
discourse, and seek common ground for the good of our
communities, our states, and our nation.

John F. Kennedy, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address
(Jan. 20, 1961), https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/ResearchAids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations/InauguralAddress.aspx).
62
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Introduction
Complicity is an ancient concept in law and ethics.
One becomes complicit in the wrongdoing of someone else
by performing actions that contribute to that
wrongdoing.1 This principle is found in the teachings of
many religious faiths,2 and it is embedded throughout the
American legal system.3 It should be no surprise then
GREGORY
MELLEMA,
COMPLICITY
AND
MORAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2016) (“When someone is complicit in the
wrongdoing of one or more principal agents, it is by virtue of
performing a contributing action.”).
2 See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE pt. II-II, Q.
62, art. 7 (addressing accomplice liability); JOHN CALVIN,
COMMENTARIES ON THE EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE GALATIANS
AND EPHESIANS 310 (William Pringle trans., 1854) (“It is not
enough that we do not, of our own accord, undertake anything
wicked. We must beware of joining or assisting those who do
wrong. In short, we must abstain from giving any consent, or
advice, or approbation, or assistance; for in all these ways we
have fellowship.”); CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH pt. 3,
¶ 1868; NIK MOHAMED AFFANDI BIN NIK YUSOFF, ISLAM &
BUSINESS 231 (Ismail Noor ed., 2002) (observing that in Islam,
“whatever is conducive towards what is prohibited is itself
forbidden”); Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is there
Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV.
59, 68 (2013) (noting that “Judaism prohibits even Jewish
consumers from facilitating a business owner’s violation of
Jewish law”).
3 See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245
(2014) (acknowledging that facilitator liability “reflects a
centuries-old view of culpability: that a person may be
responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if he
helps another to complete its commission”); U.S. D EP’T OF
JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL tit. 9, § 2474 (1998),
1
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that complicity also appears in the context of religious
exemptions from laws of general applicability, in which
the objector believes his conduct would facilitate
another’s wrongdoing. Over the past few years, highprofile religious liberty cases such as Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.4 and Zubik v. Burwell5 have
highlighted the role of complicity in Free Exercise Clause
and Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
jurisprudence.
Critics of religious exemptions have deployed a
new argument against accommodations in such cases by
suggesting that they impose “third-party harm.”6 In
particular, Professors Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel
argue that these complicity-based claims are novel and
that the claims “differ in form and in social logic” from
other free exercise claims.7 For example, a Muslim
inmate’s religious objection to shaving his beard does not

https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-2474elements-aiding-and-abetting [https://perma.cc/Z62T-W8CB]
(“The level of participation [in an unlawful venture] may be of
relatively slight moment. Also, it does not take much evidence
to satisfy the facilitation element once the defendant’s
knowledge of the unlawful purpose is established.” (citations
omitted)); Matthew Kacsmaryk, Moral Complicity at Court:
Who Decides?, PUB. DISCOURSE (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/04/16709/ [https://perma.cc/W6BJSN3X] (“In the modern era, federal, state, and territorial
governments have enacted myriad statutes, regulations, and
rules protecting the conscience rights of Americans who
abstain from practices, procedures, or products that would
violate their moral duty not to kill or cause harm.”).
4 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
5 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
6 See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2522 (2015).
7 Id. at 2519.
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stem from any complicity with another’s alleged
wrongdoing.8 Complicity-based claims, they argue,
impose “material and dignitary harms” on third parties
that are not adequately accounted for under current
doctrine.9
Professors NeJaime and Siegel define material
harm as “deterring or obstructing access to goods and
services,”10 such as abortion or same-sex spousal
benefits.11 Dignitary harms “refer to the social meaning,
including stigma, which may result from accommodating
complicity-based objections.”12 This social meaning is
communicated when religious objectors treat “third
parties as sinners in ways that can stigmatize and
demean.”13 Complicity-based claims are particularly
stigmatizing, they argue, when refusal of services
“reflects a widely understood message about a contested
sexual norm.”14 Because of these third-party harms,
Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that religious
accommodations should be diminished or eliminated in
many complicity cases.15
This Article argues that the third-party harm
theory is fundamentally flawed and that complicitybased religious accommodations are both a traditional
and necessary part of the American legal framework.
See id. at 2524 (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015)).
Id. at 2587 (“[O]ne group of citizens should not bear the
significant costs of another’s claim to religious exercise.”).
10 Id. at 2566 (“[Material harm] can also occur as objectors
withhold information that would enable an individual to
pursue alternative providers.”).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 2522.
13 Id. at 2576.
14 Id. at 2577.
15 Id. at 2516 (“At issue is not only whether but how complicity
claims are accommodated.”).
8
9
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Part I examines Supreme Court precedent in the area of
free exercise and finds significant support for complicitybased accommodations. Part II reevaluates the
magnitude and legitimacy of the asserted third-party
harms, then weighs the inconveniences imposed on third
parties against the injuries to religious objectors should
accommodations be withdrawn. Part III contends that
culture war conflicts will not be resolved through the
elimination of religious accommodations in the complicity
context and proposes a subsidiarity-based alternative to
imposing coercive legal penalties on religious objectors.
I. Complicity-Based Accommodations Are Not
Novel
Professors NeJaime and Siegel acknowledge the
longstanding and “richly elaborated” theory of
complicity.16 Yet they assert that religious exemptions
based on complicity were practically unheard of prior to
Hobby Lobby and are fundamentally different from the
precedents RFRA invoked as exemplars.17 Historically,
however, the law has treated complicity-based claims
with the same regard as other claims for religious
accommodation. In fact, Hobby Lobby reaffirmed the
Supreme Court’s long-established solicitude toward
complicity-related claims.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,18 Amish parents objected to
the state’s compulsory secondary schooling requirement
and sought an exemption for Amish children who had
completed the eighth grade.19 They condemned the
“values” promoted by high schools and asserted that
Id. at 2522–23.
Id. at 2524–29.
18 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
19 Id. at 207.
16
17
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attendance entangled their families in “a ‘worldly’
influence in conflict with their beliefs.”20 By participating
in the high school system, the Amish feared their
children would be affected by the corrupting activities
and influences of third-party students, teachers, and
administrators.21 Thus, on a plausible reading of Yoder,
the Amish parents pleaded for precisely the sort of
complicity-based religious exemption that Professors
NeJaime and Siegel suggest are novel.22
Furthermore, accommodation for the Amish
carried the risk of “third-party harm.” The parents
implicitly condemned those involved with high schooling
as being engaged in objectionable conduct. Indeed, it
might be inferred they believed that those who embraced
the worldly influences of high school would suffer
damnation.23 If Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s
characterization of dignitary harm were to be accepted,
these aspersions would certainly qualify as “dignitary
harms.” Even potential material harms were at risk.
Professors NeJaime and Siegel are correct to observe that
Yoder “conceptualized the interests of the Amish children
as aligned with their parents, such that the
accommodation benefited, rather than potentially

Id. at 210–11.
Id. at 209 (“They believed that by sending their children to
high school, they would not only expose themselves to the
danger of the censure of the church community, but . . . also
endanger their own salvation and that of their children.”).
22 See Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight, 53 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 105, 136–37 (2016) (advancing this
interpretation of Yoder).
23 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210 (“Old Order Amish communities
today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation
requires life in a church community separate and apart from
the world and worldly influence.”).
20
21
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harmed, the children themselves.”24 But the
accommodation was not limited to such cases, and
indeed, the extent to which an eighth grader can make
informed decisions about such matters is questionable.
The Supreme Court granted the accommodation despite
the potential material and dignitary harms to third
parties.
Another important precedent that Professors
NeJaime and Siegel gloss over is Thomas v. Review
Board of Indiana Employment Security Division.25 In
that case, a Jehovah’s Witness who refused work in a
tank turret factory was denied unemployment
compensation.26 Although Professors NeJaime and Siegel
acknowledge that Thomas involved a complicity-based
claim for accommodation, they attempt to distinguish it
from Hobby Lobby by claiming that Thomas did “not
single out a particular group of citizens as sinning.”27
This is both inaccurate and irrelevant.28
First, Thomas did suggest that those who
manufactured the tank turrets—as well as those who
would eventually use them to kill—were engaged in
sinful conduct.29 It was precisely because Thomas
NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2526 (citing Yoder, 406
U.S. at 209).
25 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
26 Id. at 709.
27 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2526 n.45. The Supreme
Court views Thomas as directly analogous to the complicitybased claims that Professors NeJaime and Siegel criticize. See
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778
(2014) (calling the issue raised in Thomas “nearly identical” to
the one raised in Hobby Lobby).
28 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 137–38.
29 Thomas had told the hearing referee: “I really could not, you
know, conscientiously continue to work with armaments. It
would be against all of the . . . religious principles that . . . I
have come to learn. . . .” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (alteration in
24
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believed the creation of armaments to be sinful that he
quit his job. By plausible implication, one could infer that
Thomas believed those who continued to construct
armaments (or those who would ultimately use them)
were acting sinfully.
Second, it is irrelevant because complicity
analysis should be focused on the objector’s conduct and
state of mind, not the principal’s conduct and character.30
Thus, the only relevant point of inquiry is whether
Thomas’s conduct (assisting the construction of tank
turrets) violated his religious beliefs, as he understood
them.31 Thomas’s moral judgments about his fellow
original) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec.
Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (1979)).
30 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 138; see also Marc
DeGirolami, Three Thoughts on Complicity, Dignity, and
Religious Accommodation, MIRROR JUST. (July 10, 2015),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/07/threethoughts-on-complicity-dignity-and-religious-accommodation
[https://perma.cc/RJ8S-GPZ4] (“[T]he conflation of conduct and
character is a recognizable though deeply regrettable move in
many of the sorts of disputes implicating these issues.”).
31 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“[I]t is not for us to say
that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.
Instead, our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’
whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”
(quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 716 (1981)); see also Eugene Volokh, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and Complicity in Sin, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(June
30,
2014),
https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/
30/the-religious-freedom-restoration-act-and-complicity-in-sin/
[https://perma.cc/YWL5-6JM5] (observing that precisely
“[w]here the connection becomes too attenuated and morally or
religiously culpable complicity stops is a question on which
reasonable people will differ” in a discussion of Hobby Lobby
and Thomas). Thus, “when the person believes that complicity
itself is sinful, the question is not whether our secular legal
system thinks that he has drawn the right line regarding
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factory workers and the ultimate users of the tank
turrets never factor into the analysis.
Although complicity-based claims are not
themselves novel, attempting to distinguish complicity
claims from other religious accommodation claims is
novel. Presumably, under the third-party harm theory, a
Hobby Lobby-style case would be resolved differently
when (A) the objector believes the use of abortioninducing drugs is sinful than when (B) the objector
believes that insurance or drugs are forbidden as a
general matter (that is, the objection arises without the
taint of a “sin” claim). This would be a strange result—
one that asks judges to scrutinize the form of the
objector’s religious reasoning. Not only is this a task that
judges are unsuited to perform, but it encourages
religious people to formulate their objections in creative
ways to avoid complicity. Thus, if the Amish families in
Yoder formulate their objection in terms of objecting to
secular education, they will likely win. But if they phrase
their objection as avoiding complicity with a corrupt
system of education, they will likely lose. It is more
reasonable to maintain the current rule that an objector’s
moral reasoning is irrelevant for exemption purposes.32
II. Balancing Harms: Third Parties v. Religious
Objectors

complicity; it is whether he sincerely believes that the
complicity is sinful.” Id.
32 Mark L. Rienzi, Unequal Treatment of Religious Exercises
under RFRA: Explaining the Outliers in the HHS Mandate
Cases, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 10, 11 (2013) (“Properly
understood, RFRA’s ‘substantial burden’ analysis examines
whether the government is coercing a believer to abandon a
religious exercise . . . . [T]he underlying religious reasons for
the religious exercise should be entirely irrelevant.”).
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The third-party harm theory focuses on “material
and dignitary harms” that those invoking complicitybased religious objections impose on others. But the
significance of these harms and the extent to which they
should be considered in RFRA analysis is questionable.
Furthermore, the emphasis on third parties obscures or
ignores the harms that would be imposed on religious
individuals if the law no longer accommodated their
beliefs to the extent possible. To accurately evaluate the
relative social cost of permitting or denying complicitybased accommodations, both sides of the harm equation
must be considered.
This Part will first re-examine, with a critical eye,
the material and dignitary harms Professors NeJaime
and Siegel identify. Then, using their framework of thirdparty harm, I will weigh the harms imposed on religious
objectors should RFRA-style accommodations be
weakened or withdrawn in complicity cases.
A. Harms to Third Parties
Professors NeJaime and Siegel identify a series of
material and dignitary harms to third parties that they
believe set complicity-based claims apart from other
requests for religious accommodation. In this section, the
scope and magnitude of the alleged harms to third parties
will be critically re-examined.
1. Material Harms
Material harms include the inability to obtain
certain healthcare information and services, such as
abortion, emergency contraception, and assisted
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reproduction;33 difficulty finding wedding venues and
vendors for same-sex ceremonies;34 trouble obtaining
privately-provided social services, such as adoption
services;35 and denial of spousal insurance coverage or
other employment benefits to same-sex partners.36
Professors NeJaime and Siegel worry that complicitybased refusals in these areas will lead to “an
unpredictable marketplace” for same-sex couples and
others seeking sexual and reproductive services.37
Significant material harms are indeed a relevant
concern and may be a compelling state interest.
Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons why
Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s characterization of
these harms is overstated. First, material hardships that
third parties might face due to religiously motivated
refusals are already doctrinally accounted for under the
“compelling state interest” prong of RFRA analysis.38
See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2557–58, 2573.
See id. at 2562–63.
35 Id. at 2573–74.
36 See id. at 2563 n.195 and accompanying text.
37 Id. at 2574.
38 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 133 (“Compelling state
interests include third party interests within the statutory
calculus. Indeed, one might simply say that compelling state
interests just exactly are third party interests of adequate
gravity. Whose interests is the government protecting in
resisting a religious accommodation if not those of third
parties?”);
Richard
W.
Garnett,
Accommodation,
Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 39, 46 (2014) (“The justices said in Cutter that . . . ‘courts
must take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,’ but RFRA, by
its own terms, appears to require courts to do precisely that.”
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005))); see
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“It is basic
that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
33
34
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Professors NeJaime and Siegel acknowledge this when
they observe the latent concern for third-party harms in
the Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College v. Burwell39
decisions.40 If courts considered third-party harm as a
distinct prong of analysis reserved for complicity cases,
they would double-count the harms of accommodation
and effectively give the state “another bite at the apple.”41
Under existing doctrine, only the most serious material
harms,
“endangering
paramount
[governmental]
42
interests,” are factored into RFRA’s compelling state
interest analysis. This is appropriate because although
“[m]ost exercises of constitutional rights inflict costs on
constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1944))) (explaining what constitutes a compelling
state interest). RFRA ultimately incorporated this
understanding of compelling governmental interests. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b).
39 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
40 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“That
consideration [of third party harm] will often inform the
analysis of the Government’s compelling interest and the
availability of a less restrictive means of advancing that
interest.”); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2530 (“Concern
about protecting third parties from harm was a structuring
principle of the Court’s [Hobby Lobby] decision . . . . Justice
Alito’s majority opinion proceeded on the assumption that the
government has a compelling interest in ensuring women’s
‘cost-free access to . . . contraceptive methods.’” (second
alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779–80 (2014))); see
also Wheaton, 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (“Nothing in this interim order
affects the ability of the applicant’s employees and students to
obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved
contraceptives.”).
41 DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 133.
42 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1944)).
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others . . . . not everyone who feels harmed is harmed in
a legally cognizable way.”43 Depending on the
circumstance, the mere desire to obtain nonessential
goods and services may not be a significant material
harm deserving of judicial consideration.
Second, market forces are capable of solving most
cases of material hardship when religious objectors
decline to provide services.44 Though many business
owners and organizational directors hold religious
objections to participation in same-sex marriages or
providing controversial reproductive services, a greater
number hold the opposite view.45 Even those who object
may not be willing to face the legal, social, and economic
penalties of refusing service.46 In most cases, nonobjecting wedding vendors and pharmacists will be
available to provide their services, and the alleged
material harms will be nonexistent.47 Although
Professors NeJaime and Siegel worry that some
individuals will be unable to obtain emergency
contraception or HIV medication,48 extensive fact-finding
in a pharmacist objection case could not identify a single
instance of an individual who was unable to obtain
emergency contraception or HIV drugs as a result of a
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active
Minority Groups: A Response to Professors NeJaime and Siegel,
125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 379 (2016).
44 Id. at 379 (“In a market economy, refusals of service rarely
result in anyone having to do without.”).
45 See id.
46 See id. (“Even among those with serious moral objections,
few are willing to endure the risk of litigation, boycotts,
defamatory reviews, and vandalism that can follow in the wake
of refusing service on conscientious grounds.”).
47 See id. at 379–80 (noting the paucity of complicity-based
objections and the lack of empirical evidence supporting claims
of widespread refusals).
48 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2539–40, 2573.
43
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religiously motivated refusal.49 Even “in more
conservative, religious, and rural parts of the country”50
where religious objections are likely more common,
individuals will rarely find themselves without an
adequate alternative for long.51
Finally, the law has already established limiting
principles for instances when inability to obtain essential
services would inflict serious material harm. Lifethreatening medical emergencies are a prominent
example. Even though most state medical conscience
laws do not have emergency exceptions, “federal law
requires hospitals to treat or stabilize patients in
emergencies, and that federal mandate overrides all
contrary state law.”52 It is appropriate for the law to set
reasonable limitations on the circumstances in which
religious healthcare providers may refuse to perform

See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 948 (W.D.
Wash. 2012), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v.
Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 2433, 2434 (2016) (“[A]fter years of test shopping and
litigation, Defendants have not identified even one instance
where a pharmacist refused to fill or referred a patient because
of a personal, non-conscientious objection. Despite frequent
mentions of HIV during the rulemaking process, there is no
evidence that any patient has ever been denied HIV drugs due
to a conscientious or “personal” objection. . . . Finally, no Board
witness, or any other witness, was able to identify any
particular community in Washington—rural or otherwise—
that lacked timely access to emergency contraceptives or any
other time-sensitive medication.”).
50 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2574.
51 Under a Keynesian economic account, demand creates its
own supply. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Demand Creates Its Own
Supply, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Nov. 3,
2015, 1:23 PM), https://nyti.ms/2q7v1nN.
52 Laycock, supra note 43, at 381 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395dd(b)–(c) (2012)).
49
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urgent, life-saving procedures.53 In the context of
abortion, which seems to be Professors NeJaime and
Siegel’s primary area of concern,54 such circumstances
may never even arise.55
2. Dignitary Harms
Next, Professors NeJaime and Siegel catalogue
dignitary harms they believe are not adequately
accounted for in the RFRA compelling state interest
analysis. Refusals to provide abortifacients or services for
a same-sex wedding, for example, communicate “a widely
understood message about a contested sexual norm.”56
And accommodating such refusals conveys a “social
meaning” that stigmatizes lawful conduct.57 These harms
often have emotional or symbolic effects.
This may not be the end of the analysis, however. It may be
preferable to permit religiously objecting hospitals to continue
to operate according to their beliefs (which inflicts some thirdparty harms) rather than force them to close down altogether
(which would inflict a greater aggregate amount of third-party
harms). See infra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
54 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2566–69.
55 Experts in obstetrics and gynecology dispute the assertion
that abortion is ever medically necessary. See COMM. ON
EXCELLENCE
IN
MATERNAL
HEALTHCARE,
DUBLIN
DECLARATION ON MATERNAL HEALTHCARE (2012), http://
www.dublindeclaration.com/ [https://perma.cc/X75K-MRLJ]
(declaring that “direct abortion”—the purposeful destruction of
the unborn child—“is not medically necessary to save the life
of a woman,” and affirming “a fundamental difference between
abortion, and necessary medical treatments that are carried
out to save the life of the mother, even if such treatment results
in the loss of life of her unborn child.”).
56 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2577.
57 Id. at 2522 (“By dignitary harms, we refer to the social
meaning, including stigma, which may result from
accommodating complicity-based objections.”).
53
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Despite anecdotal accounts that refusals leave
some customers feeling hurt or offended,58 it is
unpersuasive that permitting accommodations actually
imposes any dignitary harm. There are both practical
and theoretical difficulties with demonstrating the
reality of dignitary harms. On a practical level, offenses
are subjective and difficult to quantify. Does politely and
respectfully declining to arrange flowers for a same-sex
wedding communicate an injurious “social meaning” to
would-be customers?59 Perhaps for some, perhaps not for
others. Reasonable customers might disagree about
whether their dignity has been impugned. Would
different meanings be communicated if an objector said,
“I would be complicit in your sin” rather than “I would be
sinning myself”?60 In effect, courts would have to rely on
the testimony of the third party to determine how much
harm a refusal inflicted. It would be easy for a politically

See, e.g., id. at 2575–78.
See Brief for Appellants at 13, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.,
389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (No. 91615-2), 2015 WL 12632392
(“Mr. Ingersoll says that Mrs. Stutzman took his hand and
explained ‘she could not do the flowers because of her
relationship with Jesus Christ.’ According to him, she also said,
‘You know I love you dearly. I think you're a wonderful person
. . . . But my religion doesn't allow me to do this.’ Mrs. Stutzman
said all of this in a kind and considerate way.” (alteration in
original)); Answer at 12, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 132-00871-5 (Wash. Super. 2015), 2013 WL 10257927
(“Emotional about her convictions and her decision to decline,
Barronelle touched Robert’s hand and kindly told him that she
could not create the floral arrangements for his wedding
because of her Christian faith. . . . Barronelle and Mr. Ingersoll
hugged each other, and he left the store.”).
60 Laycock, supra note 43, at 382; see also supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
58
59
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influential interest group to define anything it does not
like as “harmful” to its members’ dignity.61
On the conceptual level, Professors NeJaime and
Siegel’s account of dignitary harm assumes that dignity
is conferred by others or by the government. According to
their theory, “the state’s authority includes the power to
confer individual dignity as a self-standing civic good.
People want to be dignified by the state, their self-worth
to be accorded official validation, and they perceive statecountenanced indignities meant for the protection of
religious freedom as real injuries demanding state
remediation.”62 But this is a mistaken understanding of
human dignity that is fundamentally at odds with the
American tradition. It “rejects the idea—captured in our
Declaration of Independence—that human dignity is
innate.”63 If dignity is innate to the human person, rather
Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1169, 1171 (2007) (reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005)) (“We also have
an expansive capacity to define as harmful anything we don’t
like. A rule that no religious group could do anything the
political process defined as harmful would leave all religions at
the mercy of any interest group that could persuade some
regulatory body to act.”).
62 DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 130 (summarizing the theory
espoused by Professors NeJaime and Siegel).
63 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631 (2015) (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s remarks on the intrinsic
nature of human dignity are worth including in full:
61

Human dignity has long been understood
in this country to be innate. When the Framers
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence
that “all men are created equal” and “endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights,” they referred to a vision of mankind in
which all humans are created in the image of
God and therefore of inherent worth. That
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than conferred by the state, third parties cannot be
deprived of their dignity through legal accommodations
for religious objectors.64
Even if dignitary harms could be proven and
quantified, it is unclear that the law itself plays any role
in imposing such harms. As between the religious
vision is the foundation upon which this Nation
was built.
The corollary of that principle is that
human dignity cannot be taken away by the
government. Slaves did not lose their dignity
(any more than they lost their humanity)
because the government allowed them to be
enslaved. Those held in internment camps did
not lose their dignity because the government
confined them. And those denied governmental
benefits certainly do not lose their dignity
because the government denies them those
benefits. The government cannot bestow
dignity, and it cannot take it away.
The majority's musings are thus deeply
misguided, but at least those musings can have
no effect on the dignity of the persons the
majority demeans. Its mischaracterization of
the arguments presented by the States and
their amici can have no effect on the dignity of
those litigants. Its rejection of laws preserving
the traditional definition of marriage can have
no effect on the dignity of the people who voted
for them. Its invalidation of those laws can
have no effect on the dignity of the people who
continue to adhere to the traditional definition
of marriage. And its disdain for the
understandings of liberty and dignity upon
which this Nation was founded can have no
effect on the dignity of Americans who continue
to believe in them.
Id. at 2639.
64 See id.
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objector and the third party, the law is neutral. It takes
neither the side of the objector (proscribing the conduct
the objector views as sinful or requiring everyone
similarly situated to decline their services) nor the side
of the customer (forcing all providers to engage in
objectionable commercial transactions against their
will).65 It allows both parties the opportunity to order
their affairs as they see fit. Even if critics of religious
accommodations are correct to characterize exemptions
as a privilege of private discrimination,66 it is not obvious
that the law imposes dignitary harms, or that the
dignitary harms stemming from private discrimination
constitute a compelling state interest.67 On the other
See Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A
Response to Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel, 125 YALE L.J.
F. 399, 403 (2016) (“Legally enforcing a norm against someone
suggests coercing her to follow it. So Professors NeJaime and
Siegel are lumping traditionalist-conduct exemptions together
with legal enforcement of traditionalist views. That seems fair
only if one assumes that the default is not to accommodate
these views-so that doing so seems like a gratuitous imposition
on others. Only then does actually coercing traditionalists to
violate their consciences seem like the neutral norm.”).
66 This characterization is contested. See id. (“[C]alling
exemptions a ‘special advantage’ is tendentious. It assumes
that the default in a constitutional democracy is not to protect
conscience claims that might make a political splash. Only
then does protecting them anyway seem like favoritism.”
(footnote omitted)).
67 The only free exercise case finding a compelling state interest
in eliminating private discrimination was Bob Jones University
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). See Alex Reed,
RFRA v. ENDA: Religious Freedom and Employment
Discrimination, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 2, 38 (2016). In Bob
Jones, the state interest in promoting racial equality in
education, expressed by all three branches of the federal
government over the course of several decades, outweighed the
religious claimant’s interest in free exercise. See 461 U.S. at
604. Racial discrimination in education results in both
65
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hand, if courts adopted the dignitary harm theory, it
could become a self-fulfilling prophesy: the more that
courts “say that a policy or belief expresses disdain for a
group, the more it will take on that social meaning.”68
Even if the law imposed a dignitary harm, this
harm is non-unique and cannot be considered by courts.
The First Amendment permits speech and other forms of
expression that impose dignitary harms all the time.
What makes dignitary harm a trump card for free
exercise, but not for other First Amendment liberties,
such as free speech or freedom of the press? Because
dignitary harms “are expressive harms, based on the
‘communicative impact’ of the religious practice,”69 they
material and dignitary harms under Professors NeJaime and
Siegel’s rubric. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe the
Court’s judgment was limited in scope and not generally
applicable to issues of sexual mores with which Professors
NeJaime and Siegel are concerned. See Girgis, supra note 65,
at 411. See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, The Sexual Integrity
of Religious Schools and Tax Exemption, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 255 (2017).
68 See Girgis, supra note 65, at 404. Professor Richard Epstein
expresses a similar concern that countenancing such harmswithout-legal-injury would make “virtually all human conduct
. . . actionable.” Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for the
First Amendment, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25 (2018). He
continues:
To protect individuals against mere offensive
conduct is to invite people to merit that exalted
status by getting angrier and angrier, so that
their private resentments give strong claims of
rights against one another. Everyone can play
this game so that mutual indignation becomes
the source of great anxiety or worse.
Id.
69 Laycock, supra note 43, at 376.
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are precisely the sorts of harms that the government is
normally disallowed from considering as a legitimate
state interest.70 First Amendment jurisprudence is
replete with instances of protected speech that impose
dignitary harm on third parties: parade organizers may
exclude disfavored groups,71 proselytizers may insult
their listeners’ most cherished beliefs,72 private
expressive associations may discriminate against
members based on their sexual conduct,73 and protesters
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The
government generally has a freer hand in restricting
expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or
spoken word. It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct
because it has expressive elements.” (citations omitted));
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring
the state interest in regulating conduct be “unrelated to the
suppression of free expression”); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S.
Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (8-0 decision) (finding that the
government cannot refuse to register a trademark on the
grounds that “it expresses ideas that offend”).
71 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 578–79 (1995) (9-0 decision) (ruling that
the state’s interest in nondiscrimination could not be invoked
to require a private parade organizer to modify its expressive
conduct by including an LGBT group) (“The very idea that a
noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts
and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all
people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to
nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of
orthodox expression.”).
72 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(affirming the right of a Jehovah’s Witness to play a
phonograph record that “attacked the [Catholic] religion and
church” and “incensed” listeners).
73 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–61 (2000);
see also Laycock, supra note 43, at 377 (observing that “Dale
had been an active and engaged scout for twelve years; the
dignitary harm of being excluded from scouting at that point
must have been vastly greater than the typical dignitary harm
70
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may express even the most vulgar and offensive slogans
at their audience’s most vulnerable moments.74 The effect
of such speech on third parties is legally irrelevant.75
That some third parties will find religiously motivated
refusals to be upsetting, offensive, or disagreeable is no
doubt true. But the resulting emotional or symbolic
injuries are simply not a matter of judicial concern.
It is inconsistent with First Amendment doctrine
and norms to assert that religious refusals that either
explicitly or implicitly “reflect[] and reiterate[] a familiar
message about contested sexual norms”76 deserve less
protection because of the viewpoint expressed by that

of being refused a one-time arms-length transaction” but that
“no Justice found a compelling interest in preventing [that]
harm”).
74 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011) (8-1 decision)
(upholding protection of slogans such as “‘God Hates the
USA/Thank God for 9/11,’ ‘America is Doomed,’ ‘Don't Pray for
the USA,’ ‘Thank God for IEDs,’ ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’
‘Pope in Hell,’ ‘Priests Rape Boys,’ ‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You're
Going to Hell,’ and ‘God Hates You’” displayed at a soldier’s
Catholic funeral).
75 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (“We have said time and again
that ‘the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
their hearers.’” (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592
(1969))); Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (“Such speech cannot be
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”);
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (“[T]he point of all speech protection . . .
is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes
are misguided, or even hurtful.”); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (“If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”).
76 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2576.

[254]
104

COMPLICITY-BASED RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018)

refusal.77 This impermissibly singles out religious
speakers who affirm traditional sexual moral norms for
disfavored status. The viewpoint-neutrality violation
here is even more egregious because it specially targets
religious groups because those groups are politically
engaged in culture-wide disputes about the morality of
abortion and same-sex marriage.78 Professors NeJaime
See supra note 69; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“When the
government targets not subject matter, but particular views
taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination
is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” (citation omitted));
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (“We
have long held, for example, that nonverbal expressive activity
can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because
of the ideas it expresses . . . .”).
78 Professors NeJaime and Siegel place significant emphasis on
the fact that many religious objectors to same-sex marriage
and abortion are engaged in a broader politically active
community. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2542–45
(noting with concern that “complicity-based conscience claims
are asserted in society-wide conflicts by mobilized groups and
individuals acting in coalitions that reach across religious
denominational lines”). They assert that dignitary harms are
especially pernicious when such “a mass movement amplifies
[the refusal’s] power to demean.” Id. at 2578. In other words,
Professors NeJaime and Siegel contend, “Because these
conscientious objectors engage in a political argument, they
lose their right to conscientious objection.” See Laycock, supra
note 43, at 371 (summarizing their view); see also Girgis, supra
note 65, at 402 (“The implication is clear: Officials should
discount claims when granting them might empower believers
to push for their views, or even change laws they oppose.”).
This is preposterous. It also betrays a desperation to “lockin” the newly prevailing cultural orthodoxy on contested moral
issues. As Laycock put it: “Religious conservatives are
77
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and Siegel would likely have little objection to an
“Orthodox Jew with a wholesale grocery business [who]
refuses to stock or sell nonkosher items” in violation of
local ordinances because “he does not want to tempt or
assist any other Jew to consume the nonkosher items.”79
Even though this is a complicity-based objection, it does
not implicate a “national political battle over nonkosher
food” and Professors NeJaime and Siegel would likely not
be concerned about the “social meanings” the shopkeeper
communicates to customers who are “harmed or
inconvenienced.”80 Their argument depends (at least in
part) on the socio-political context of religious
accommodations, which is currently concentrated on
conflicts with the sexual revolution.
Religious actors are free to express tenets of their
faith that either explicitly or implicitly tell non-members
that they are sinning or will suffer damnation.81 Yet the

constitutionally entitled to argue for their views on the
regulation of sex . . . . And their exercise of that right is not a
ground for forfeiting other rights they may have, including
their right to religious exemptions. . . . Religious conservatives
do not forfeit their right to conscientious objection by making
political arguments about the laws they object to, and they do
not forfeit their right to make political arguments by invoking
their right to conscientious objection.” Laycock, supra note 43,
at 371–72.
79 Laycock, supra note 43, at 382.
80
Id. Laycock observes that this hypothetical also
demonstrates that “[c]omplicity is irrelevant to Professors
NeJaime and Siegel’s argument—unless they mean for readers
to assume that complicity claims are a lesser kind of claim, less
deserving of protection.” Id. at 382–83.
81 See Girgis, supra note 65, at 406 (“Religious freedom includes
nothing if not the rights to worship, proselytize, and convert—
forms of conduct (and speech) that can express the conviction
that outsiders are wrong. Perhaps not just wrong, but deluded
about matters of cosmic importance around which they have
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law does not prohibit these more straightforward sources
of dignitary injury. It would be perverse to contend that
directly saying, “You are a murderer!”82 is protected
speech, but that the speaker should be penalized for
indirectly communicating that same “social meaning”
through her refusal of services.83 The notion that
religious accommodations should be curtailed to shelter
third parties from messages about sin they do not like is
truly remarkable for its audacity.
B. Harms to Religious Objectors
There is serious reason to doubt the model of
third-party harm that Professors NeJaime and Siegel
propose. But assuming material and dignitary harms
should be considered in complicity cases, how should
courts evaluate the harms to third parties as compared
to the harms to the religious objectors themselves? To
gather a sense of the true social cost of accommodation
versus non-accommodation, the potential material and
dignitary harms imposed on religious objectors must also
be considered.
If complicity-based accommodations were to be
significantly weakened or withdrawn, it is improbable
that sincere religious objectors would continue to engage
in business that makes them complicit with what they

ordered their lives—even damnably wrong.” (footnote
omitted)).
82 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2576.
83 See id. at 2586 (“Are there ways to accommodate religious
persons without giving legal sanction to their view that other
law-abiding citizens are sinning? If the government grants an
accommodation, is the accommodation structured to block or
amplify dissemination of religious claims about the sins of
other citizens?”).
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believe to be sinful.84 In the long run, sincere religious
objectors might leave an entire industry altogether. In
the short term, religious objectors will be subjected to
catastrophic fines and penalties, as has been the case
when RFRA-style protections are unavailing. As will be
seen, the material and dignitary harms imposed on
religious objectors would be significant, both in scope and
magnitude, if RFRA accommodations were diminished or
eliminated in complicity cases.
1. Material Harms
When RFRA protections are unavailable or
denied, religious objectors commonly face grave
consequences for refusing to provide goods or services in
situations they believe would make them complicit with

Cases are plentiful in which religious objectors choose to
close their businesses rather than operate in a manner
contrary to their convictions. See infra notes 85–97 and
accompanying text; see also Epstein, supra note 68, at 36 (“The
religious organizations only ask that people, for a limited
subset of services, go down the block to another business that
is happy to serve them. The human rights proponents ask
people to give up their religious beliefs or go out of business
entirely.”).
84
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sin. Florists,85 bakers,86 wedding photographers,87 and
other artistic professionals88 who object to participating
See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash.
2017). Baronelle Stuzmann, the elderly owner of Arlene’s
Flowers in Richland, Washington, declined to provide wedding
flower arrangements for a longtime customer’s same-sex
wedding. Id. at 549. As a result, Stuzmann was found
personally liable for violating Washington’s law against
discrimination and Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 550. The
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the judgment ordering
Stuzmann to pay monetary damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
Id. at 568. In a media statement, Stuzmann’s lawyers alleged
that the judgment threatens “not only her business, but also
her family’s savings, retirement funds, and home.” Washington
Floral Artist to Ask US Supreme Court to Protect Her Freedom,
ALLIANCE
DEFENDING
FREEDOM
(Feb.
16,
2017),
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/8608 [https://perma.cc/
4ZLB-N7XP].
Although the State of Washington has a religious freedom
clause in its constitution, it has no RFRA statute. WASH.
CONST., art. I, § 11; see Hunter Schwarz, 19 States that have
‘Religious Freedom’ Laws Like Indiana’s that No One is
Boycotting, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/03/27/19-states-thathave-religious-freedom-laws-like-indianas-that-no-one-isboycotting/ [https://perma.cc/QKP6-XHQL].
86 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272
(Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027
(Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(2017). A same-sex couple brought complaint against the
proprietor of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, for violating
Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) when he declined
to bake a cake for their wedding ceremony. Id. at 277. Phillips
was found guilty and ordered to re-educate his staff and amend
his company policies to comply with CADA to avoid financial
penalties. Id. Masterpiece Cakeshop no longer offers wedding
cakes. See Bakery Will Stop Making Wedding Cakes After
Losing Discrimination Case, CBS DENVER (May 30, 2014),
http://denver.cbslocal.com/2014/05/30/bakery-will-stop-makingwedding-cakes-after-losing-discrimination-case/
85
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in same-sex ceremonies frequently face catastrophic fines
and even potential jail time, which threatens their
livelihoods and well-being. Owners of small bed-and-

[https://perma.cc/7423-AFXE]. Although the State of Colorado
has a religious freedom clause in its constitution, it has no
RFRA statute. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; Schwarz, supra
note 85.
For the case of Sweet Cakes by Melissa, see infra notes 94–
98 and accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428
(N.M. App. 2012). When Jonathan and Elaine Huguenin, the
owners of Elane Photography, declined to photograph Vanessa
Willock’s same-sex commitment ceremony, Willock filed a
complaint with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission.
Id. at 433. An administrative hearing found Elane
Photography guilty of violating the New Mexico Human Rights
Act and awarded $6,637.94 in attorneys’ fees to Willock. See id.
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013). In
a separate concurrence, Justice Bosson wrote that although the
Huguenins “now are compelled by law to compromise the very
religious beliefs that inspire their lives,” this sacrifice “is the
price of citizenship.” Id. at 79, 80 (Bosson, J., concurring).
88 Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski, the owners of a Phoenixbased art studio that specializes in lettering and calligraphy
for wedding invitations, have appealed the denial of a preenforcement challenge against a local ordinance that requires
them to provide services to same-sex weddings and prevents
them from communicating their faith-based reasons for
celebrating marriages between one man and one woman. See
Brief for Appellant at 1–2, Brush & Nib Studio v. City of
Phoenix, No. CV2016-052251, 2017 WL 1113222 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 2017). Violation of the ordinance carries penalties of up
to $2,500 in fines and six months in jail. See PHX., ARIZ., CODE
§§ 1-5, 18-4, 18-7 (2010); see also Artists to Appeals Court: Halt
Phoenix Ordinance that Punishes Artistic Freedom with Jail
Time, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Mar. 9, 2017),
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/10037
[https://perma.cc/T9VE-J8HB].
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breakfast establishments89 and wedding venue
providers90 are often subjected to the same fate.
See, e.g., Will Brumleve, B&B Ordered to Pay Damages to
Same-Sex Couple, Stop Discriminating, FORD CTY. REC. (Mar.
29, 2016), http://www.paxtonrecord.net/news/courts-policeand-fire/2016-03-29/bb-ordered-pay-damages-same-sexcouple-stop-discriminating [https://perma.cc/T9VE-J8HB]. Jim
and Beth Walder, who own TimberCreek Bed & Breakfast in
Illinois, face large fines for refusing to rent their facility for a
same-sex wedding ceremony. Id.
In 2016, an administrative law judge ordered the Walders
to pay a total of $80,000 in “emotional distress” damages and
attorneys’ fees for making a same-sex couple feel “embarrassed
and humiliated.” Id. The judge even “ordered the B&B to offer
the Wathens access to the facility, within one year, for an event
celebrating their civil union.” Id. The judgment is being
appealed. See Will Brumleve, B&B Owner Taking Appeal to
Court, Foregoing IHRC Hearing, FORD CTY. REC. (Dec. 26,
2016),
http://www.paxtonrecord.net/news/courts-police-andfire/2016-12-26/bb-owner-taking-appeal-court-foregoing-ihrchearing [https://perma.cc/V4GL-WF6H].
90 See, e.g., Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n Of The United
Methodist Church v. Papaleo, No. CIV.A.07-3802 (JAP), 2007
WL 3349787 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007), aff’d in part and remanded
sub nom. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 F. App’x 232 (3d Cir.
2009). New Jersey’s Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association
was ordered to offer their pavilion as a wedding venue for
same-sex couples under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination. Id. at *2. Immediately thereafter, the
Association shuttered its wedding venue service. See MaryAnn
Spoto, State Sides with Lesbian Couple in Fight against Ocean
Grove Association, NJ.COM (Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.nj.com/
news/index.ssf/2008/12/judge_rules_monmouth_church_gr.html
[https://perma.cc/774T-ESGL] (noting that the parachurch
organization no longer permits wedding ceremonies on its
property).
In 2011, a lesbian couple successfully sued the Catholic
owners of the Wildflower Inn in Vermont for declining to host
their same-sex reception. See Katie Zezima, Couple Sues a
Vermont Inn for Rejecting Gay Wedding, N.Y. TIMES (July 19,
89
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Pharmacists and other health care professionals who
decline to provide birth control they believe to be
abortifacient can also be confronted with hefty
penalties.91 Both for-profit and non-profit organizations
2011), https://nyti.ms/2psU7iK. As punishment, the owners
had to pay $10,000 in civil fines to the Vermont Human Rights
Commission and put $20,000 in a charitable trust for the
lesbian couple. See Katie J.M. Baker, ‘Family Friendly’ Inn
Decides it Would Rather Stop Hosting Wedding Receptions
Altogether Than Cater to Lesbian Couple, JEZEBEL (Aug. 24,
2012), http://jezebel.com/5937548/family-friendly-inn-decidesit-would-rather-stop-hosting-weddings-altogether-than-caterto-lesbian-couple [https://perma.cc/XS8D-RZEZ]. Jim and
Mary O’Reilly no longer host wedding receptions on their
property. Id.
Robert and Cynthia Gifford, the residents of a New York
farm that also serves as a wedding venue, were fined $13,000
in a similar case in 2014. See Kirsten Andersen, Catholic
Couple Fined $13,000 for Refusing to Host Same-Sex ‘Wedding’
at Their Farm,
LIFESITENEWS (Aug. 20, 2014),
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/catholic-couple-fined-13000for-refusing-to-host-same-sex-wedding-at-their [https:// perma.cc/
F9SL-D89F]. The Giffords ultimately decided not to appeal the
ruling and have stopped using the farm for wedding
ceremonies. See Valerie Richardson, New York Farm Owners
Give up Legal Fight after Being Fined $13,000 for Refusing to
Host Gay Wedding, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/23/robertcynthia-giffords-give-legal-fight-over-same/ [https://perma.cc/
F9SL-D89F].
91 See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016). In 2007, the
Washington State Pharmacy Board passed regulations
eliminating conscience-based referrals and requiring
pharmacies to carry “morning-after pills” Plan B and ella. Id.
at 1072. Failure to comply with the regulations may result in
“discipline or other enforcement actions.” WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 246-869-010 (2007). The Storman family, which owns Ralph’s
Thriftway pharmacy, and two pharmacists objected to the
regulations because of their belief that “dispensing these drugs

[262]
112

COMPLICITY-BASED RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018)

may suffer when complicity-based religious objections
are not respected.92 Perhaps most radically of all,
‘constitutes direct participation in the destruction of human
life.’” Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1073 n.3. The trial court found that
the State’s regulations were designed to target religious health
care providers. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925,
987 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v.
Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ claims and held that the
regulations did “not infringe a fundamental right.” Stormans,
794 F.3d 1064. at 1088.
Over the objection of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito and Thomas, the Supreme Court denied review.
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016). Justice
Alito observed that Washington’s regulations “are likely to
make a pharmacist unemployable if he or she objects on
religious grounds to dispensing certain prescription
medications.” Id. at 2433 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Anticipating the effect of the regulations, he
suggested that Washington “would rather have no pharmacy
than one that doesn’t toe the line on abortifacient emergency
contraceptives.” Id. at 2440. Marveling at the policy’s “hostility
toward religious objections” and the Court’s failure to review
the case, Justice Alito warned, “If this is a sign of how religious
liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who
value religious freedom have cause for great concern.” Id. at
2433.
92 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2775–76 (2014). Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, and Mardel
faced crippling fines for non-compliance with the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations about
contraceptive provision. The Court detailed the various costs of
non-compliance for Hobby Lobby:
If the Hahns and Greens and their companies
do not yield to this demand, the economic
consequences will be severe. If the companies
continue to offer group health plans that do not
cover the contraceptives at issue, they will be
taxed $100 per day for each affected individual.
For Hobby Lobby, the bill could amount to $1.3
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Professors NeJaime and Siegel suggest that religious
leaders—including priests, pastors, imams, and rabbis—

million per day or about $475 million per year;
for Conestoga, the assessment could be $90,000
per day or $33 million per year; and for Mardel,
it could be $40,000 per day or about $15 million
per year. These sums are surely substantial.
Id. at 2275–76 (citation omitted). In addition to these for-profit
examples, consider the non-profit petitioners in Zubik v.
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (per curiam). The Roman
Catholic Bishop of Pittsburgh, Priests for Life, the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Washington, East Texas Baptist
University, the Little Sisters of the Poor, Southern Nazarene
University, and Geneva College were among the organizations
that challenged the Department’s contraceptive mandate on
RFRA grounds. Id. Organizations that fail to comply with the
contraceptive mandate or obtain an exemption would be
subject to a daily fine of $100 per employee. See Sarah Torre,
Religious Liberty at the Supreme Court: Little Sisters of the
Poor Take on Obamacare Mandate, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar.
22, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/report/
religious-liberty-the-supreme-court-little-sisters-the-poor-take
-obamacare [https://perma.cc/M5V7-U9ZA].
If unable to obtain an exemption, the Little Sisters of the
Poor could be fined “up to $70 million a year” for
noncompliance. Id. Catholic Charities in Pittsburgh, which has
a total operating budget of $10 million, would face between “$2
million to $4 million a year” in federal fines. See Brian Bowling,
Bishops Zubik, Persico Say They Can’t Cooperate with Health
Care Mandate, TRIBLIVE (Nov. 12, 2013), http://triblive.com/
news/adminpage/5054656-74/mandate-catholic-coverage [https://
perma.cc/8ZVB-XYG4]. California’s tiny Thomas Aquinas
College “faces fines of up to $2.8 million a year if it does not
comply with the mandate.” Kurt Jensen, Ultimate Relief from
Mandate May Lie Beyond the Courts, Say Plaintiffs, CATH.
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.catholicnews.com/
services/englishnews/2016/ultimate-relief-from-mandate-may-liebeyond-the-courts-say-plaintiffs [https://perma.cc/8ZVB-XYG4].
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should have no choice but to solemnize same-sex
ceremonies.93
Among the many penalties imposed on religious
objectors in complicity cases, one particularly draconian
instance stands out: In 2013, Aaron and Melissa Klein,
the proprietors of a small Oregon bakery called Sweet
Cakes by Melissa, declined to bake a cake for a same-sex
wedding ceremony.94 When the same-sex couple filed a
complaint, Oregon Labor Commissioner Brad Avakian
ordered the Kleins to pay $135,000 in damages to
compensate the couple for “emotional, mental and
physical suffering” related to the refusal.95 Although the
judgment is still being appealed, the massive penalty and
their vulnerability to future litigation forced the Kleins
to close their bakery in October 2016.96 “We lost our
business,” Melissa Klein said.97 “You work so hard to
build something up, and something you’ve poured your

See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2561 (“Many states
that allow same-sex couples to marry have enacted legislation
making clear that religious denominations and clergy have no
obligation to solemnize a same-sex marriage.”); cf. Complaint
at 2, Knapp v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (D.
Idaho 2016) (No. 2:14-CV-00441-REB) (describing the plight of
Christian ministers at a wedding chapel who faced up to 180
days in jail and up to $1,000 in fines for each day they refused
to perform same-sex ceremonies in violation of a local
nondiscrimination ordinance).
94 See In re Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-14, 45-14, 2015 WL
4868796, at *3 (OR BOLI July 2, 2015).
95 Id. at *23.
96 See Casey Parks, Sweet Cakes by Melissa, Bakery that
Turned Away Lesbians, Closes, OREGONIAN (Oct. 6, 2016),
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/10/sweet_
cakes_by_melissa_bakery.html [https://perma.cc/R7TV-543Y].
97 Id.
93
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heart into and was your passion, to lose that has been
devastating for me.”98
These heavy-handed fines and penalties
ultimately drive religious objectors out of their chosen
service, trade, or industry. In addition to the economic
harms imposed on the objectors themselves, the vacuum
created imposes material harms on third parties—
particularly foster children, victims of human trafficking,
the elderly poor, and all those who depend on religious
hospitals and healthcare providers. The withdrawal of
faith-based adoption services from states where “antidiscrimination” legislation would force organizations like
Catholic Charities to place children with adoptive samesex couples,99 for instance, has left a gaping vacuum that
harms thousands of children who languish in the foster
care system.100 A member of the U.S. Commission on
Id.
See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Say Rules on Gay Parents
Limit Freedom of Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2011),
https://nyti.ms/2n7lwCY
(noting
Catholic
Charities’
withdrawal of adoption services from Massachusetts, Illinois,
and Washington, D.C.).
100 See Ryan Anderson & Sarah Torre, Adoption, Foster Care,
and Conscience Protection, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.heritage.org/marriage-and-family/report/adoptionfoster-care-and-conscience-protection [https://perma.cc/R3VUFJTD].
In the two decades before Catholic Charities of Boston
ended its adoption program, it helped place at least 720
children in permanent adoptive homes. See Archdiocese of
Boston, Catholic Charities of Boston To Discontinue Adoption
Services (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.bostoncatholic.org/
uploadedFiles/News_releases_2006_statement060310-1.pdf;
see also U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Discrimination
Against Catholic Adoption Services (2016), http://www.usccb
.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/AdoptionServices-Fact-Sheet-2016.pdf (“Catholic Charities of Boston,
which had been one of the nation’s oldest adoption agencies,
98
99
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Civil Rights observed with concern in 2016: “It is
possible, perhaps even probable, that in the near future
there will be no orthodox Christian organizations
partnering with the government to provide adoption and
foster care services in the United States.”101
Forcing religious-affiliated organizations, such as
Christian colleges, to provide health insurance plans that
include allegedly abortifacient forms of birth control led
some institutions to end health insurance coverage for
their students and employees altogether.102 If forced to

faced a very difficult choice: violate its conscience, or close its
doors.”).
In 2011, Illinois passed civil union legislation that, in
conjunction with an existing “anti-discrimination” law,
required faith-based foster care and adoption service providers
to place children with cohabiting and same-sex couples. See
Manya A. Brachear, 3 Dioceses Drop Foster Care Lawsuit, CHI.
TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/201111-15/news/ct-met-catholic-charities-foster-care-20111115_1_
civil-unions-act-catholic-charities-religious-freedom-protection.
As a result, Catholic Charities, the Evangelical Child and
Family Agency, and other faith-based adoption service
providers had to drop the adoption services of more than 2,000
children. See Anderson & Torre, supra. Even when these
children’s cases are transferred to other agencies, the
ostracism of conscientious faith-based providers burdens the
foster care system. Id.
101 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE:
RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL
LIBERTIES 61 (2016) (statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow).
102 See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 793 (7th Cir.
2015). When the Seventh Circuit refused to issue a preliminary
injunction against the contraceptive mandate, Wheaton
College chose to drop its health insurance plan altogether
rather than violate its religious principles or pay substantial
fines. See Manya Brachear Pashman, Wheaton College Ends
Coverage amid Fight Against Birth Control Mandate, CHI.
TRIB. (July 29, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
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choose between their charitable work and their religious
beliefs, the Little Sisters of the Poor would be compelled
to stop serving the 13,000 elderly poor they care for on a
regular basis.103
Likewise, victims of human trafficking are
harmed when religious groups’ anti-trafficking work is
defunded simply because those groups do not provide or
refer for abortion, contraception, or sterilization
services.104 The failure to respect faith-based providers’
breaking/ct-wheaton-college-ends-student-insurance-met20150728-story [https://perma.cc/6ZGB-EUYQ].
103 See Who Are the Little Sisters of the Poor?, THE LITTLE
SISTERS OF THE POOR, http://thelittlesistersofthepoor.com/whoare-the-little-sisters-of-the-poor-1/#who-are-the-little-sistersof-the-poor [https://perma.cc/Y5L7-XLS8] (last visited Dec. 20,
2017) (“The Little Sisters serve more than 13,000 elderly poor
in 31 countries around the world. The first home opened in
America in 1868 and now there are nearly 30 homes in the U.S.
where the elderly and dying are cared for with love and dignity
until God calls them home.”); see also Loraine Maguire,
Obamacare Attacks Religious Liberty: Little Sisters Mother
Provincial,
USA
TODAY
(Mar.
22,
2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/03/22/little-sisterspoor-obamacare-hhs-mandate-supreme-court-religious-libertycolumn/82076170/ [https://perma.cc/BKS3-ES3Q] (“Most of the
people who live in my residence have nowhere else to go.”).
104 See Chris Boyette, Federal Program Denies Grant to
Catholic Group to Help Sex Trafficking Victims, CNN (Dec. 6,
2011), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/06/federal-program
-denies-grant-to-catholic-group-to-help-sex-trafficking-victims/
(reporting on the defunding of the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops’ Migrant and Refugee Service). The offending
language in the USCCB’s contract read:
As we are a Catholic organization, we need
to ensure that our victims services funds are
not used to refer or fund activities that would
be contrary to our moral convictions and
religious
beliefs.
.
.
.
Specifically,

[268]
118

COMPLICITY-BASED RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018)

complicity-based objections to participating in such
services ultimately harms “thousands of victims” of
human trafficking.105
Finally, if the Church Amendment and other socalled “healthcare refusal” laws—which protect the
conscience rights of health care providers to refuse to
perform or assist with abortions—are withdrawn or
diminished as Professors NeJaime and Siegel propose,106
many faith-based hospitals and physicians would exit the
healthcare industry rather than violate their beliefs. This
would represent a massive disruption of American
healthcare delivery since “one in six patients in the
United States is treated by a Catholic hospital”107 and
subcontractors could not provide or refer for
abortion services or contraceptive materials for
our clients pursuant to this contract.
KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR 229
(1st ed. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting the terms of the
contract). Representative Chris Smith, the author of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, remarked, “If you
are a Catholic, or other faith-based [non-governmental
organization], or a secular organization of conscience, there is
now clear proof that your grant application will not be
considered under a fair, impartial and totally transparent
process . . . .” See Boyette, supra.
105 See Boyette, supra note 104; see also Pete Winn, HHS
Withholds Grant from U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
Apparently Because Church Opposes Abortion, CATH. NEWS
SERV. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/
article/hhs-withholds-grant-us-conference-catholic-bishopsapparently-because-church-opposes (noting that federal grants
to the USCCB’s Migrant and Relief Services had helped “more
than 2,700 victims” of human trafficking).
106 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2566.
107 Id. at 2556–57 (citing Catholic Health Care in the United
States, CATH. HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S. 1 (Jan. 2014),
https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/
cha_miniprofile_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3WL-Z4SA]).
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“[r]eligious hospitals represent nearly a fifth of the
healthcare delivery system in the United States.”108 The
extent to which Professors NeJaime and Siegel
successfully demonstrate the United States’ dependence
on faith-based healthcare is exactly the extent to which
they reveal the devastation that would result if Catholic
and other religious healthcare providers were forced to
close their doors. Millions of Americans would experience
reduced access and greater difficulty in obtaining lifesaving treatment and other medical services.109
2. Dignitary Harms
Professors NeJaime and Siegel assert that
providing exemptions for complicity-based claims “has
potential to harm those whom the claimants view as
sinning.”110 But requiring religious actors to either
violate their beliefs or close their businesses imposes
dignitary harms on those religious objectors. Unlike the
existing legal regime—which offers latitude for both
individuals seeking services and religious objectors to
live in accordance with their beliefs—weakening RFRA
protections would marginalize religious dissenters’ views
Id. at 2557 (citing Jennifer Harper, Doctors Face Religious
Conflicts at Hospitals, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/doctorsreport-religious-conflicts-at-hospitals [http://perma.cc/TN3TUDBE]).
109 See Catholic Health Care in the United States, CATH.
HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S. (Jan. 2017), https://www.
chausa.org/about/about/facts-statistics [https://perma.cc/GE7BUNQJ] (indicating that 649 Catholic hospitals annually admit
more than five million patients, provide 105 million outpatient
visits, and receive more than twenty million emergency room
visits).
110 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2516.
108
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with the force of law. The “social meaning” of revoking
RFRA protections for pharmacists who do not wish to
dispense abortifacients or adoption agencies which do not
wish to place children with same-sex couples is clear:
traditional views on contested sexual norms cannot be
acted upon in public life. It sends a message that
individuals with religiously motivated beliefs about
sexual morality are not welcome in certain industries.
(“No Evangelicals need apply.”) Indeed, if an individual
does act upon her religious convictions and integrates her
faith and work, the law will not shield her and may
actually impose penalties for her divergence from the
new political orthodoxy on sexual morality.
Such a legal regime imposes a far greater stigma
on religious believers than does the status quo on third
parties seeking services. This is for two reasons. First,
because the force of law would be used to actively
penalize complicity-based refusals, this legal regime
would be more coercive. Without robust RFRA
protections, the law would directly disfavor religious
individuals who hold traditional views by making their
refusals illegal. The status quo minimizes coercion by
permitting the religious actor to refuse or not, and by
allowing the third party seeking services to select any
other willing provider. Second, weakening or eliminating
accommodations for complicity-based refusals has a
pedagogical effect that stigmatizes religious actors who
hold traditional views on sexual morality. Rather than
remain neutral as between the religious objector and the
third party and allowing both sides to retain maximal
freedom to organize their affairs, such a rule would
explicitly disfavor the religious objector.111 It would treat
the dignitary interests of the third party as more worthy
111

See supra note 65.
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of legal solicitude. The “social meaning” of this favoritism
would communicate that the religious objector has sinned
by acting on her archaic moral beliefs. It would convey,
in short, that she is a bigot.112
Thus, using Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s
reasoning and definition of dignitary harm, the religious
objector is harmed at least as much (if not more) when
accommodations are denied than the third party seeking
services when accommodations are permitted.
III. Accommodations Promote Social Peace
Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that
accommodations for complicity-based religious objections
will only prolong and intensify conflict over culture war
issues.113 They argue that the “social logic” of “crossdenominational mobilization”114 means politically active
religious traditionalists will try “to enforce traditional
morality in the law of abortion and marriage and to seek
conscience-based exemptions from laws that depart from
traditional morality.”115 Having lost the primary battle,
traditionalists now use complicity-based claims as “a way
It is commonly asserted that protections for religious
freedom shelter bigotry. See, e.g., Valerie Tarico, Right-Wing
Christianity Teaches Bigotry: The Ugly Roots of Indiana’s New
Anti-Gay Law, SALON (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.
salon.com/2015/04/04/right_wing_christianity_teaches_bigotry
_the_ugly_roots_of_indianas_new_anti_gay_law_partner/
[https://perma.cc/BU6R-H5QZ] (describing a state RFRA law
as motivated by “bigotry and homophobia”). Curtailing RFRA
protections because of the “dignitary harms” imposed on third
parties grants these accusations legal imprimatur.
113 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2553–63
(“[A]ccommodating religious exemption claims may not settle
conflict, as many contend.”).
114 Id. at 2544.
115 Id. at 2548.
112
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to continue conflict over community-wide norms in a new
form.”116 Widespread healthcare refusal laws, for
example, can be used to impede access to abortion117—
especially in areas dominated by religiously affiliated
healthcare providers.118 Conscience protections for
wedding vendors could be used “to forestall or restrict an
antidiscrimination regime that includes sexual
orientation.”119
Thus,
religious
accommodations
perpetuate culture war rivalries that Professors NeJaime
and Siegel would rather put an end to.
Even if Professors NeJaime and Siegel are right
that religious exemptions perpetuate culture war
conflicts, there is no reasonable or equitable alternative.
There is reason for hope, however, that accommodations
can promote social peace rather than intensify conflict.
A. No Reasonable Alternatives to
Accommodation Exist
No matter how much Professors NeJaime and
Siegel wish that the culture wars would disappear if
religious accommodations were curtailed, the reality is
that crushing the “other side” will not work.120 This is
Id. at 2553.
Id. at 2555.
118 Id. at 2557.
119 Id. at 2564.
120 See generally Girgis, supra note 65, at 413. Although
NeJaime and Siegel may not be motivated by political
vindictiveness, there is an undercurrent of victor’s justice
present among opponents of religious accommodations. This
attitude is best reflected by Professor Mark Tushnet, who
wrote in a revealing and now infamous blog post:
116
117

The culture wars are over; they lost, we won. .
. . For liberals, the question now is how to deal
with the losers in the culture wars. That’s
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mostly a question of tactics. My own judgment
is that taking a hard line (“You lost, live with
it”) is better than trying to accommodate the
losers . . . . Trying to be nice to the losers didn’t
work well after the Civil War, nor after Brown.
(And taking a hard line seemed to work
reasonably well in Germany and Japan after
1945.) I should note that LGBT activists in
particular seem to have settled on the hard-line
approach, while some liberal academics defend
more accommodating approaches. . . . Of course
all bets are off if Donald Trump becomes
President.
Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal
Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016, 1:15 PM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensivecrouch-liberal.html [https://perma.cc/DCW5-BZKU].
In a later clarification blog post, Tushnet noted that
reactions to his post claimed that he believed religious
objectors, especially in complicity cases, should be treated like
defeated Confederates and Nazis:
In the context I was writing about, for example,
“taking a hard line” means opposing on both
policy and constitutional grounds free-standing
so-called “religious liberty” laws. . . . [T]he
exemptions that might satisfy “our side” would
have to be pretty narrow [including] . . . some
sort of constraint on the exemptions’
availability in cases of claimed “complicity.” (I
don’t know whether even these would be
acceptable to activists on “our side.”) . . . [L]ike
the Japanese soldiers who were stranded on
islands in the Pacific and didn't know the war
was over, so too many people on their side
haven't yet come to terms with the fact that
they lost the culture wars.
Mark Tushnet, What Does “Taking a Hard Line” Mean?,
BALKINIZATION (May 9, 2016, 8:28 PM), https://balkin.
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because the clash runs deeper than the surface legal
conflict between free exercise and nondiscrimination: it
is a “conflict between two worldviews, both held with the
intensity generally associated with religious belief.”121
The most fundamental convictions about the nature of
God, man, and morality are at stake. A take-no-prisoners
legal approach is unlikely to change the deeply held
beliefs of religious traditionalists who, as of yet, still
constitute a sizable nationwide minority. This is
especially true while conscience protections in complicity
cases still enjoy substantial support.122 Subjecting
sympathetic religious objectors to severe penalties and

blogspot.com/2016/05/what-does-taking-hard-line-mean.html
[https://perma.cc/G84Q-F77S].
121 See Statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow, supra note 101,
at 43.
122 See PEW RES. CTR., WHERE THE PUBLIC STANDS ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VS. NONDISCRIMINATION 3 (2016) (finding
that 30% of U.S. adults believe “[e]mployers who have a
religious objection to the use of birth control should be . . . able
to refuse to provide it in health insurance plans for their
employees,” and that 48% believe “[b]usinesses that provide
wedding services should be . . . able to refuse to provide those
services to same-sex couples if the business owner has religious
objections to homosexuality”); National Poll Shows Majority
Support Healthcare Conscience Rights, Conscience Law,
CHRISTIAN
MED.
ASS’N
(May
2011),
http://www.
freedom2care.org/docLib/200905011_Pollingsummaryhandout
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D3Z-FS3T] (finding that 77% of U.S.
adults believe healthcare professionals should not be “forced to
participate in procedures or practices to which they have moral
objections,” and that 50% support “a law under which federal
agencies and other government bodies that receive federal
funds could not discriminate against hospitals and health care
professionals who decline to participate in abortions.”).
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jail time may alienate those who would otherwise support
socially liberal policies on abortion and LGBT issues.123
Court rulings which are perceived to crush
religious dissenters may unintentionally revive the
specter of persecution (perhaps plausibly), leading
disfavored religious objectors to cling more intensely to
their beliefs.124 A hard line approach would socially
exclude and marginalize religious objectors, driving
many people of faith out of entire industries and
segments of society.125 Indeed, activists demanding the
PEW RES. CTR, supra note 122, at 5. (finding that 22% of
U.S. adults sympathized with both sides of the contraceptive
coverage issue, and that 18% of U.S. adults sympathized with
both sides of the wedding vendor issue).
124 See Bradford Richardson, Persecution of Christians is on the
Rise, Americans Say, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/5/christiansfacing-increased-persecution-america-po/
[https://perma.cc/
FKA3-CGX8] (reporting that 63% of LifeWay survey
respondents believe Christians face growing levels of
persecution); see also Right Wing Watch Staff, The Persecution
Complex: The Religious Right’s Deceptive Rallying Cry, RIGHT
WING WATCH 2 (2014), http://files.rightwingwatch.org/uploads/
persecution_report_V2.pdf
(“The
religious
persecution
narrative is nothing new . . . but it has taken off in recent years
in reaction to advances in gay rights and reproductive
freedom.”); cf. Matthew 5:11 (New King James) (“Blessed are
you when they . . . persecute you . . . for My sake.”).
125 See Statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow, supra note 101,
at 111 (“People who live in accordance with their unfashionable
religious beliefs will be unable to work in many professions.
When a baker or a photographer or a CEO is forced to
participate in activities that offend their religious beliefs, what
hope is there for a doctor, a counselor, a lawyer? Traditional
believers will have very few careers where they can both make
a living and live according to their faith. It is an unofficial form
of the legal disabilities imposed on English Catholics following
the Glorious Revolution.”); cf. Sohrab Ahmari, Sweden
Blacklists an Antiabortion Midwife, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2017,
123
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withdrawal of religious liberty protections may
themselves be engaged in a form of social hostility toward
religious groups that adhere to traditional moral
beliefs.126 If “pluralist democracy is dynamic and
fragile,”127 then maintaining it “depends on the
commitment of all politically relevant groups to its
processes. Political losers may exit the system unless
they think their interests will be accommodated or their
losses from exiting will exceed their gains.”128 This is a
distinct danger because pluralistic democracy “needs
emerging groups to commit to its processes just as much
as it needs established groups to stick to those
processes.”129
Removing accommodations and imposing stiff
penalties on religious objectors may also entrench
resistance to ascendant sexual mores and foment social
backlash. When courts aggressively implement a social
agenda, it can be interpreted that the courts engage
opponents more intensely than supporters, which could
lead to political exploitation and widespread resistance to

2:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-blacklists-anantiabortion-midwife-1491768904
[https://perma.cc/HF7QAGDQ] (describing the legal and professional ostracism of a
Swedish midwife who refuses to perform abortions).
126 See, e.g., Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch, supra note
120.
127 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How
Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of
Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294 (2005).
128 Id. Eskridge adds, “Groups will disengage when they believe
that participation in the system is pointless due to their
permanent defeat on issues important to them . . . or when the
political process imposes fundamental burdens on them or
threatens their group identity or cohesion.” Id. at 1293.
129 Id. at 1294.
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that agenda.130 Widespread support for conscience
exceptions in complicity cases, the deeply held nature of
religious belief, and the backing of a major political party
increases the likelihood of political backlash. The
elimination of accommodations in complicity cases is
unlikely to dampen the flame of cultural contests. Not
only are these conflicts inevitable, they may even be
desirable when properly channeled.131
Since “total war” tactics are deleterious to social
cohesion, living in a sharply divided pluralistic society
requires both accommodation of religious believers and
respect for those who do not share their moralistic views.
Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s explanation that
complicity claims are unique in their “social logic” is
inadequate. Even if religious accommodations are
sometimes used “to enforce traditional norms against
those who do not share their beliefs”132 rather than to
“preserv[e] space for distinctive religious beliefs and

See Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage
Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 148–51
(2013); see also Neal Devins, I Love You, Big Brother, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 1283, 1297 (1999) (remarking on “the disastrous
backlash that occurred in the wake of Roe v. Wade”); Michael
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). Professor Siegel,
while acknowledging destructive aspects of backlash, believes
that it nonetheless has redeeming and socially beneficial
qualities. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
373, 388–91 (2007).
131 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 214
(testimony of Marc O. DeGirolami) (“Conflict is an essential
and deep feature of our society—both unavoidable and actually
desirable, since its source is our different backgrounds,
different outlooks, and different memories.”).
132 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2591.
130
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practices,”133 this use is no more injurious to pluralism
than the proposal for which Professors NeJaime and
Siegel advocate. On balance, offering robust protections
for religious objectors is more likely to contribute to a
diverse public square.134
Rather than viewing social conflict as “a barely
contained threat to individual rights and peaceful
coexistence”135 and “evincing skepticism that shared life
is at all possible between groups locked in intractable
conflict,”136 skeptics of religious accommodations should
embrace what Professor John Inazu calls, confident
pluralism.137 This approach calls both religious believers
and skeptics alike to acknowledge that “shared existence
is not only possible, but also necessary.”138 According to
Inazu, both sides should accept a constitutional
commitment to both inclusion (that we are continually
reshaping the boundaries of our political community)139
and dissent (that even as we work to extend and
Id. at 2590.
See Ryan T. Anderson, The Defense of Marriage Isn’t Over,
PUB.
DISCOURSE
(Oct.
8,
2014),
http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/10/13889 [http://perma.cc/UA547EH5] (“Protecting religious liberty and the rights of
conscience is the embodiment of a principled pluralism that
fosters a more diverse civil sphere. Indeed, tolerance is
essential to promoting peaceful coexistence even amid
disagreement.”).
135 Girgis, supra note 65, at 413.
136 See id. (suggesting that the “honest Rousseauian fear that
“[i]t is impossible to live at peace with those whom we regard
as damned” motivates the quest to retract religious
accommodations (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 122 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin ed.,
1968) (1762)).
137 JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM (2016).
138 Id. at 6. Professor Inazu adds that confident pluralism “does
not suppress or ignore conflict—it invites it.” Id. at 7.
139 Id. at 15–16.
133
134

[279]
129

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2

renegotiate these boundaries, we recognize the freedom
of citizens in the voluntary groups of civil society to differ
from established norms).140 Although neither of these
principles are absolute, they can help foster a modest
agreement on the individual rights of both parties.
Rather than seeking to impose their own orthodoxy, both
sides must allow room for mutual toleration.141
Confident pluralism also proposes a civic
aspiration of “living speech,” which prioritizes dialogue
and persuasion over combativeness and coercion. 142 Both
traditionalists and advocates clamoring for the
withdrawal of conscience protections would do well to
recall the Court’s advice to the Texans who proscribed
flag desecration: “The way to preserve the flag’s special
role is not to punish those who feel differently about these
matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong.”143
B. Private Ordering and Markets Mitigate
Social Conflict
Rather than using the coercive force of law to
impose a new orthodoxy on matters of sexual politics,
private ordering—guided by principles of confident
pluralism144—should be allowed to flourish. MarketId. at 16.
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Tolerance
is a two-way street. Otherwise, the rule mandates orthodoxy,
not anti-discrimination.”).
142 INAZU, supra note 137, at 101.
143 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989).
144 Professor Inazu affirms that “[b]oycotts, strikes, and
protests against private actors are in most cases compatible
with confident pluralism,” but warns that “[w]hen we engage
in these forms of collective action, we should bear in mind the
civic aspirations of tolerance, humility, and patience.” See
supra note 137, at 115.
140
141
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based systems, which permit businesses and civil society
groups to shape social norms, are preferable to a
compulsory
legal
approach
that
eliminates
accommodations for religious objectors.145 Rather than
impose a uniform orthodoxy on society about contested
moral issues, “subsidiary institutions [should] hav[e]
spheres of private ordering that allow them to organically
. . . come to their own conclusions about those contested
matters.”146
Civic organizations—whether motivated by profit
or conviction—have already begun to develop their own
approaches to navigating conflicts between religious
liberty and issues of gender, sexuality, and reproduction.
For example, the popular room-rental service Airbnb
recently adopted a policy prohibiting all of its users from
discriminating on the basis of “sexual orientation, gender
identity, or marital status.”147 Airbnb’s policy shapes
social norms by excluding many religious traditionalists

See Adam J. MacLeod, Tempering Civil Rights Conflicts:
Common Law for the Moral Marketplace, 2016 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 643, 672 (2016) (arguing that laws impinging on religious
liberty “do not leave space for mediating conflicts between
actors within the domains of private ordering. Instead, they
turn all important questions into zero-sum contests and raise
the stakes even higher”); id. at 679–80 (observing that when
civic goods “require cooperation for their realization, legal
coercion destroys both the economic and the moral value of
those plural practices and institutions of private ordering.”).
146
Michael P. Moreland, Religious Freedom and
Discrimination, 4 J. CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT 10 (2014).
147 See Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy: Our Commitment to
Inclusion and Respect, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/
help/article/1405/airbnb-s-nondiscrimination-policy--ourcommitment-to-inclusion-and-respect
[https://perma.cc/495K2DZ2] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
145

[281]
131

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2

from using its service.148 But religious traditionalists
remain at liberty to use other online room-rental services,
or to set up their own service that complies with the
dictates of conscience. Ride-hailing services such as Uber
and Lyft prohibit both drivers and passengers from
discriminating on the basis of “sexual orientation or
gender identity.”149 If for some reason a religious objector
refused to use Uber on that basis, they would remain free
to hail a taxi or launch their own ride-hailing service.
Boycotts can serve a similar purpose, so long as
they are used to “represent[] minority viewpoints against
majoritarian norms” rather than “harness[] majoritarian
power to squelch dissenting viewpoints.”150 Most
Users who decline “won’t be able to host or book using
Airbnb” and are invited to close their accounts. General
questions about the Airbnb Community Commitment, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1523/general-questionsabout-the-airbnb-community-commitment [https://perma.cc/
8AJN-JWF5] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
149 Ben Wear, Uber, Lyft Say Policies Ban Discrimination
Based on Sexual Orientation, AUSTIN AM-STATESMAN (Apr. 24,
2017), http://www.statesman.com/news/transportation/uberlyft-say-policies-ban-discrimination-based-sexualorientation/eWDh5e48iN3OXCBP1rmDEM/ [https://perma.cc/
PJK3-VFNM]; Uber Non-Discrimination Policy, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/legal/policies/non-discrimination-policy/
en/ [https://perma.cc/8JKY-X6LT] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017)
(prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of discrimination
against riders or drivers based on . . . sexual orientation, . . .
marital status, [or] gender identity”). Violators “lose access to
the Uber platform.” Id.
150 See INAZU, supra note 137, at 107; see also Ross Douthat,
The Case of Brendan Eich, N.Y. TIMES: EVALUATIONS (Apr. 8,
2014), https://nyti.ms/2mpxYAr (“[Although] a healthy
pluralism inevitably involves community norms and
community policing in some form, I suspect that an elite
culture that enforces the new norms on marriage this strictly,
and polices its own ranks this rigorously, is likely to find
148
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consumer boycotts—such as those against Target, Chickfil-A, and Hobby Lobby151—“occur in reasonably
pluralistic settings.”152 Others forms of collective action,
which resemble witch-hunting more than constructive
norm-shaping, might violate the principles of
pluralism.153
Instances of market-driven norm-shaping are
healthy insofar as they seek to nudge attitudes and
behaviors rather than coerce them. If businesses such as
Airbnb and Uber can use market power to express their
views and influence public opinion (even when doing so
imposes material or “dignitary harms” on third parties),
why not ChristianMingle when its core religious beliefs
reasons (and, indeed, is already adept at finding them) to
become increasingly anti-pluralist whenever it has the chance
to enforce those same norms on society as a whole.”).
151 See, e.g., Hayley Peterson, The Target Boycott Cost More
than Anyone Expected — and the CEO was Blindsided, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/targetceo-blindsided-by-boycott-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/T32U-XRSJ]
(describing the effects of a boycott related to Target’s
transgender restroom policy); Editorial, Progressives Against
Lunch, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/progressives-against-lunch-1462744747
[https://
perma.cc/LCC9-K52H] (describing both boycotts and counterboycotts of Chick-Fil-A); Trudy Ring, Here’s Why George Takei
Wants You to Boycott Hobby Lobby, ADVOCATE (July 2, 2014),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/2014/07/02/heres-whygeorge-takei-wants-you-boycott-hobby-lobby [https://perma.cc/
E6YG-C4M3].
152 INAZU, supra note 137, at 113.
153 See, e.g., Mary Bowerman, Indiana Pizza Shop that Won’t
Cater Gay Weddings to Close, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/04/01/
indiana-family-pizzeria-wont-cater-gay-weddings/70813430/
[https://perma.cc/VA7N-3KVS] (describing how journalists
baited a small, rural pizza parlor into saying that it would not
serve same-sex weddings and how, as a result, the parlor was
overwhelmed by threatening messages and forced to close).
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are implicated?154 Why not religious business owners—
such as florists, bakers, and pharmacists? By the same
principle, civic institutions with religious commitments
should be accommodated so that they may set their own
codes of conduct when possible. Private ordering can
alleviate social tensions when its structures embody
“tolerance, humility, and patience”155 rather than
exacerbate division.
Conclusion
Complicity is a long-established concept in our
legal tradition. It neither operates differently in the
context of religious liberty claims, nor does it deserve the
law’s special disfavor. The third-party harm theory
exaggerates complicity’s perceived differences from other
religious liberty claims and invents its own novel concept
of “dignitary harms,” which has never before been
countenanced in First Amendment jurisprudence. Even
if the third-party harm theory were coherent and
cognizable, its current formulation regrettably excludes
the material and dignitary harms that would be imposed
on religious objectors should accommodations be
narrowed or revoked. In other words, “dignitary harm” is
a
two-edged
sword.
Eliminating
religious
accommodations in these situations is unlikely to foster
social peace.

See Jacob Gershman & Sara Randazzo, ChristianMingle
Opens Doors to Gay Singles Under Settlement, WALL ST. J.: L.
BLOG (June 30, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/06/30/
christianmingle-com-opens-doors-to-gay-singles-undersettlement/ (reporting that ChristianMingle has agreed to
permit same-sex matches after settling a discrimination
lawsuit).
155 INAZU, supra note 137, at 83.
154
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Thus, instead of using the coercive force of law to
censor expressive conduct and to lock-in the gains of the
sexual revolution, market-based systems and private
ordering should be allowed to take their course. If we are
to have a truly diverse and pluralistic public square,
there must be consideration for both religious actors and
third parties. That includes robust accommodations for
religious objectors in complicity cases. Perhaps most
importantly, it includes a posture of humility and mutual
respect.
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COMMENT

THE ILLUSORY CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF “NO
TRESPASSING” SIGNS IN
TENNESSEE
STATE V. CHRISTENSEN, 517 S.W.3D 60 (TENN. 2017).
Rainey Lankford*
In State v. Christensen,1 the Tennessee Supreme
Court decided whether police officers violated the
defendant’s constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures when the officers entered the
defendant’s property despite the presence of “No
Trespassing” signs. The court ruled that the officers’
entrance did not constitute a violation of the defendant’s
constitutional rights.2 Thus, the court upheld the ruling
of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, stating that
“No Trespassing” signs, alone, do not prohibit officers
J.D. Candidate, May 2018, The University of Tennessee
College of Law. B.A., Psychology, Lipscomb University, 2014,
cum laude. I would like to thank Dean Melanie Wilson, Dean
& Lindsay Young Distinguished Professor of Law at The
University of Tennessee College of Law, for her instruction and
guidance in the study of criminal procedure.
1 517 S.W.3d 60, 68–69 (Tenn. 2017).
2 Id. at 63–64.
*
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from coming onto the curtilage of a home to conduct a
consensual knock-and-talk encounter. Therefore, the
ruling by the trial court, finding the defendant guilty,
was upheld.3
On August 3, 2013, two narcotics investigators
responded to a tip regarding a pseudoephedrine
purchase.4 The tip eventually led them to the defendant’s
home, which had a gravel driveway.5 Two “No
Trespassing” signs were posted at the entrance to the
driveway.6 Further, there were no physical obstructions
preventing entrance to the driveway.7 The defendant
came out to meet the investigators as they approached
his porch.8 When the defendant opened the door, the
investigators smelled the distinct odor that comes with
the production of methamphetamine.9 The officers then
spoke to the defendant and asked for consent to search
his home.10 The defendant told the investigators that he
had done nothing illegal and would not consent to the
search.11 At this point, the investigators determined that,
due to the present exigent circumstances (namely the
volatile
nature
of
the
chemicals
used
in
methamphetamine production), they had to enter the
home to investigate further.12 One investigator forced
open the locked door to the home and began searching.13
This initial entry led to the discovery of a
methamphetamine lab and several firearms.14
Id. at 79.
Id. at 64.
5 Id. at 65.
6 Id. at 67.
7 Id. at 64.
8 Id. at 65.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 66.
3
4
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At trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress
the evidence gathered as a result of the warrantless
search of his home, claiming that the presence of a “No
Trespassing” sign meant that a warrant was required to
enter his property.15 The defendant’s motion was denied
and he was convicted of five separate criminal charges.16
Later, on direct appeal, the defendant contended that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
evidence found within his home.17 Conducting de novo
review, the court of appeals determined that the growing
legal consensus was that “the implied invitation of the
front door can be revoked but that the revocation must be
obvious to the casual visitor who wishes only to contact
the residents of a property.”18 Based on this
determination, the court of appeals found the presence of
a mere “No Trespassing” sign insufficient to revoke any
aforementioned implied invitation.19
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court began
its review by affirming the rights enshrined in the federal
and state constitutions forbidding warrantless searches
of homes and specific Fourth Amendment protections
against searches on the curtilage of one’s home.20 The
court pointed out, however, that not every police
interaction on the curtilage of one’s home constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.21 Citing the U.S.

State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015
Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14,
2015).
16 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 63.
17 Christensen, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357, at *7.
18 Id. at *13 (citing State v. Grice, 767 S.E.2d 312, 319 (N.C.
2015)).
19 Id.
20 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 68–69 (citing U.S. CONST. amend.
IV; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7). The court here “assume[d][]
without deciding” that the driveway was part of the curtilage
of the defendant’s home. Id. at 69.
21 Id. at 69.
15
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Florida v. Jardines,22 the court
recognized the right of police officers to approach the
curtilage of a home under “knock-and-talk” rules.23 It was
further established that “knock-and-talk” interactions
are not considered searches under the Fourth
Amendment; therefore, the question became whether the
defendant had revoked this implied invitation to “knockand-talk.”24
The issue of whether “No Trespassing” signs are
enough to revoke any implied license to “knock-and-talk”
has been the subject of many state and federal cases. 25
However, the majority of states have found that such
signs were not enough revoke an implied license to
“knock-and-talk.”26 The court specifically noted State v.
Rigoulot,27 which stated that “No Trespassing” signs
“cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude normal,
legitimate inquiries.”28 In order to determine when a “No
Trespassing” sign may be reasonably interpreted to
forbid “knock-and-talk” situations, the court turned to
the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carloss.29 The
court specifically pointed to a concurring opinion in
Carloss, in which Chief Judge Tymkovich said that the
Id. at 69–70 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409,
1415–16 (2013) (holding that while police officers have a
license to approach the home and knock, if they are engaging
in conduct that is clearly a search, around the curtilage, any
such evidence gathered as a result should be suppressed)).
23 Id. at 70 (citing State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2003)).
24 Id. (citing Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417–18).
25 Id. at 72 (citing cases).
26 Id. at 73 (citing cases).
27 846 P.2d 918, 923 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (stating that “No
Trespassing” signs are not enough to forbid normal legitimate
requests, and that police officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment if they enter the curtilage under these
circumstances).
28 Id. at 923.
29 818 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 2016).
22
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legal standard to be applied in these cases should be
whether a reasonable person, under a totality of the
circumstances, would view a “No Trespassing” sign as
something that would place any bearing on one’s ability
to go up to the curtilage of the home and knock.30 The
Tennessee Supreme Court adopted this totality of the
circumstances standard.31 In examining the totality of
the circumstances in the defendant’s case, the court
determined that the simple presence of “No Trespassing”
signs did not suffice to deter officers from approaching
the curtilage of his home.32 The court suggested, however,
that if the defendant’s driveway had been blocked by a
locked gate or a fence, then it would have been more clear
to the officers that any license to approach the home had
been revoked.33 No such barrier existed in the
defendant’s case.34 Based on this determination, the
court found that the defendant had no expectation of
privacy in regards to individuals approaching his home.35
Thus, the ruling of the trial court was upheld.36
The dissent rebuffed the court’s assertion that it
might take a locked fence or gate for a citizen to invoke
his Fourth Amendment rights.37 In writing the dissent,
Justice Sharon Lee pointed out that the court’s physical
barriers standard would leave poorer citizens without the
means to invoke their rights.38 Justice Lee further stated
that “No Trespassing” signs clearly state the property
owner’s desire to not have visitors.39 Many other
Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 74–75 (citing Carloss, 818 F.3d
at 999–1000).
31 Id. at 75.
32 Id. at 75–76.
33 Id. at 78–79.
34 Id. at 76–77.
35 Id. at 78.
36 Id. at 79.
37 Id. (Lee, J., dissenting).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 80.
30
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jurisdictions have taken such a stance.40 One such
example is People v. Scott,41 where the New York Court of
Appeals declared that physical barriers and/or
appropriate signage was enough to make clear that entry
was not permitted by the property owner.42 However, the
dissent also considered the totality of the circumstances
standard set forth by the court.43 Justice Lee contended
that, even under the totality of the circumstances
standard, the defendant made it clear that he wanted no
visitors.44 Justice Lee argued that while the majority
claimed it was applying a totality of the circumstances
standard, it failed to actually weigh the significance of
the signs.45 Citing a case from the Maryland Court of
Appeals, Justice Lee contended that the presence of two
clearly visible “No Trespassing” signs was enough to
make it clear to the investigators that no one was
welcome to approach the home.46 Justice Lee also argued
that because the defendant had made clear that no one
was welcome on his property, he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy on his curtilage, and those
expectations were violated by the warrantless intrusion
by the investigators.47
Christensen will have an effect on homeowners
across the state of Tennessee by raising the bar for what
revokes the implied invitation for individuals to approach
the curtilage of their home and knock. Now, Tennesseans
must utilize a physical barrier, such as a locked fence or
gate, to put the public on notice that unsolicited visitors
are not welcome to approach their home. While this
See, e.g., id. at 80–81 (citing cases).
593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338 (N.Y. 1992).
42 Id.
43 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 82 (Lee, J., dissenting).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. (citing Jones v. State, 943 A.2d 1, 12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2008)).
47 Id. at 83.
40
41
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ruling follows most other jurisdictions in making physical
barriers the standard for revocation of the implied
invitation to “knock-and-talk,” it still leaves some
questions. One such question is whether such a rule will
create a burden on lower income households that wish to
invoke their Fourth Amendment rights.48 It will be
important to follow future cases to see if there are any
disparities based on income. Another question is how
other courts will treat the varying rulings taken by
jurisdictions on this issue. While most jurisdictions have
adopted the same rule as Tennessee, others have chosen
the alternative.49 Until there is a significant divergence
on this issue in the federal courts, however, this area of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will likely remain one
governed by jurisdiction-specific rules.

48
49

See id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
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